

CONTEMPORARY TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE AND POLITICAL DISPUTE ISSUES

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ABSTRACT: *This paper discusses contemporary Turkish-Russian relations, which are negatively or positively influenced by a variety of tactical and strategic factors depending on the regional and international variables that undoubtedly affect directly and indirectly these relations. As a result of these factors and variables, the relations between the two sides oscillated between convergence and disagreement at times In accordance with bilateral economic interests or concerns posed by facts about controversial issues to decision-makers on both sides .*

INTRODUCTION

President 'Vladimir Putin' to power in Russia in 2000 and increased momentum relations with the arrival of the 'Justice and Development' to rule in Turkey in 2002 and his policy of zeroing problems with neighboring countries, including the Black Sea countries as Russia Although there are many regional and international hot spots that put Turkish-Russian relations at stake, However, the relations witnessed a remarkable positive development through mutual visits between the officials of the two countries, which contributed to raising the level of economic and trade exchange and joint projects, especially in the field of energy, which plays an important role in the establishment of strategic relations leading to convergence of policy, As well as the strengthening of cooperation in various fields, and the Turkish-Russian relations began to become more and more convergent since 2004, to gain momentum after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in mid-2016, melting the 'iceberg' witnessed by the relationship between the two sides.

The Importance of Research

The importance of research lies in the analysis and study of the obvious transformations in contemporary Turkish-Russian relations, ranging from convergence and divergence. At times, the converging nature is the dominant feature of the relations between the two countries. At other times, the nature of the difference is characteristic of them, which can be explained in the light of several factors, including the direction of the political leadership of the two countries. Including the size of the international and regional commitments of each Party. And it is determined in the light of the nature of issues and controversial problems between them.

The objectives of the research The aim of the research is to confirm the conviction that it is normal to change the positions of countries and their interim policies in accordance with their interests, and that the Turkish-Russian relations contemporary do not go beyond this scope, developments in bilateral relations between the two countries Witnessed an unprecedented movement between them in a serious attempt to re-establish relations on the basis of understandings of equal strategic dimensions and broad prospects that will enhance trust between the parties and dispel concerns and turn some issues of In order to create a new reality. The problem of finding out where the current Turkish-Russian relations are heading? disagreement into issues of joint cooperation between them. This problem has secondary questions, perhaps the most prominent of which is the nature of the Turkish-Russian mutual motives contributing to the convergence of the two countries? What are the determinants facing the development of contemporary Turkish-Russian relations? What are the issues of rapprochement between the two

countries? What are the issues of disagreement between the two countries? What are the issues of disagreement between the two countries?

The hypothesis of the research

The hypothesis of the research that the nature of rapprochement and positive cooperation between Turkey and Russia on the economic and commercial level, would restore negative relations on the political issues and contain the differences that occur as a result of regional and international developments.

Research Methodology

To achieve the goal of the research, the researcher followed several methods including the descriptive-historical approach and the analytical approach to describe and analyze the motives and determinants and the most important issues of compatibility and issues of difference in contemporary Turkish-Russian relations in an attempt to explore the future of these relations. Conclusion and conclusions.

Chapter one

the motives and determinants of contemporary Turkish-Russian relations

The first aspect is the motives and determinants of contemporary Turkish-Russian relations.

the motives of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement are motivated by the Turkish-Russian rapprochement, the most important of which are:

1. the Turkish Prime Minister Ben Ali Yildirim that the Turkish rapprochement with Russia comes in the context of re-establishment of the Turkey for its external relations with regional and global neighbors, reducing hostility and increasing friendships, , And can be counted as an update of the policy of zeroing the problems created by the former Turkish Prime Minister 'Ahmed Daoud Oglo', as well as Ankara's desire to return to balance in the axes of its foreign policy to the east in the sense of insecurity of Western attitudes to its side, First after the fall of the Russian fighter and later with the failed coup attempt (1).
2. The fight against terrorism is a priority for the two States. After military operations are now a continuous phenomenon against Turkish civilian and military sites, the campaign of bombings against its installations, soldiers and civilians is expected to intensify if Turkey does not address the issue of the Kurds; It needs Russian efforts to calm the Kurds, as Russia did not stand against the demands of the Kurds in freedom and independence, and if the Kurds in Iraq and Syria have new national privileges, the risk of geographical division will extend to it. Russia, on the other hand, fears terrorism will spread to the territory To its territory in particular that about 15% of its population are Muslims, Some of them may be influenced by the views and behavior of extremist Islamic organizations and engage in a terrorist campaign in Russia. Turkey is a gateway to

Eurasia, the Russian vital space represented by most of the former Soviet Union. Turkey is associated with the peoples of Central Asia in this space. With ethnic and religious partners present, and other historical motivations to imagine a disturbing Islamic future, especially in Moscow, which is supported by Turkey to some of the Crimean Tatars, which Russia is extremist. Russia is interested in eradicating and financing the sources of terrorism, and is interested in cooperating with various States to confront it (2). The tragic bombing of the Ataturk airport on June 28, 2016, officially adopted by the State Organization (Da'ash), was carried out by elements mostly from Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Russia and Chechnya).

, Which will make Turkey and Russia discuss a future for more cooperation in the security aspects, in particular, to counter the extremist ideology spread in the region from Syria to the Central Asian countries, Turkey can play an important role in this area by exporting a moderate Islamic model of the States. The Islamic Central Asian countries and Russia's approximately 30 million Muslims(3).

3. Turkey seeks to calm some of the external crises, especially the Syrian crisis, which Russia has a specific word in it, especially in the part of the Kurdish armed factions, as the provision of Moscow to the Democratic Union Party, 'the Syrian wing of the PKK' weapons, The hosting of leaders of the Democratic People's Party of Turkey, close to the 'Kurdistan' pushed Ankara to feel the danger of Russia's support for the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, Which set the stage for opening new channels with Moscow that would end the dispute. The Turkish government is also concerned about Russian military support for the Democratic Union Party, north-eastern Syria, near the southern border of Turkey, and the risk of such support, The success of the Kurds of Syria in the establishment of a Kurdish region, which strengthens the position of the Kurds of Turkey, and raises the ceiling of their demands for the establishment of self-rule along the lines of their compatriots in Syria. Russia has threatened to supply the PKK, which Turkey and its Western allies classify as "A terrorist organization" with anti-aircraft weapons to use in its war against Turkish government forces, which broke out in July 2015 and renewed the country's ethnic war after nearly three years of calm. And aspires to President 'Erdogan', through the restoration of relations with Russia, , To achieve a victory over the 'Kurdistan' in the Turkish territory, and at the same time, hoping that the disengagement of Moscow with the Kurds of Syria, to reduce the Kurdish gains behind the border, and to prevent their control of the corridor - Graves - Azaz, what stands in the way of achieving the Kurdish dream In connecting 'Canton Afrin ' In northeastern Syria. Russia, for its part, seeks a settlement in Syria with the preservation of its interests as much as possible, and wants to maintain good relations with neighboring countries, and Turkey precisely because it is also an important player in Syria, and to create a balance in the face of Iran, which is tense or worsening relations With it as a result of an ever-increasing contradiction in the perception of the reality and future of the Syrian regime(4).

4. Turkey has realized over time that it has become a scapegoat for Western attitudes towards the Syrian crisis. Where Ankara resented the Western support for Syria's Kurdish democratic forces and its alliance with the Kurds

of the Kurdish Workers, which called for the rotation of its back, albeit temporarily for the western camp. Turkey has realized that armed groups opposed to the rule of the Syrian President and the Western and regional countries that support it do not have a clear strategy for resolving the Syrian crisis, which called for reconsideration. In its policy towards these parties, especially after it realized that it is not reliable in resolving this crisis, and this contributed to Turkey's orientation towards Russia to find a political settlement to this crisis(5).

5. Turkey feels that NATO has failed and left it alone in the face of Russia in the crash of the Russian plane, the alliance's timid support to Ankara during the crisis with Moscow, and the failure of the Alliance to help build a missile defense system, and pressure to retreat from the agreement that had signed it with a Chinese company in this field, all of which have aroused resentment of Turkey from the West.

-6. Turkey believes that the United States of America will go ahead with the policy of withdrawing from the region, or solving its problems, and believes that the American vacuum led to the return of Russia as an important regional and international player, and has no interest in the break with Russia, but to establish the best relations with them.(6)

7. Turkish disappointment of the Western positions following the failed coup, which is considered inadequate and late in contrast to Russia's rapid and clear position supporting the Turkish government in the face of the coup (7).

8. Turkey, which has lost all its efforts to join the European Union, has begun to feel that the road is closed to integration with the Europeans. It seems that by allowing refugees to cross into Europe, Turkey wanted to inform the Europeans of the importance of the Turkish role it can play in case If it was accepted membership in the Union, but it seems that the Turks understood it late, procrastination Europeans in the process of Turkey's accession to the Union, The implementation of their obligations under the Refugee Agreement and the revocation of the visa for Turkish citizens wishing to enter the Schengen space means that Europe will not allow the Islamic Republic of Turkey to enter the Union and enjoy its great advantages. Russia is well aware of the reasons why Europeans have blocked Turkish accession to the European Union, and the growing sense of resentment and discontent among the Turks toward Western leaders. Moscow is well aware that Turkey's distance from the Europeans means its rapprochement with the Russians, and vice versa(8).

9. Turkey and Russia have lost economically as a result of the strained relations between them. The level of the GDP of both countries has declined. Trade between the two sides has declined after it was high and a candidate for the rise. This has resulted in large numbers of citizens whose interests have been damaged. The markets were affected and the exporters and importers were affected. The stakeholders were the most affected. The governments of the two countries were subjected to popular pressure. President Putin and Erdogan had no choice but to repair or mitigate the breach. Therefore, the two sides worked to improve their relationship for their economic and trade gains(9).

.10 - For its part, Russia needs, for political, economic and strategic reasons, to maintain good relations with

neighboring countries, and Turkey specifically; to make a breakthrough in the ranks of the International Alliance against the Syrian regime, from the Turkish portal, although Of the great divergence in the positions of the parties on the Syrian issue. Moscow is aware that Turkey is the most influential regional state in the opposition, the most able to act on the Syrian ground, the border of about 900 km with Syria, and its relations with Islamic factions fighting on Earth . And regretted that, President Putin is exploiting the deterioration of confidence between Turkey and the United States, which has not responded to any of the Turkish requirements in Syria, including those that directly affect Turkish national security, such as the Kurdish file. Ankara is sensing not only its influence, but also its political relations With its surroundings also because the forces against the influence of Turkey has become a full arc in the strategic environment, as well as, the repercussions of the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, , Which has made Turkey more recognizable in Syria, with some formality changes to face-saving, and the same may apply in relations with Iran, Iraq, Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, and the supply of gas is more responsive and responsive to the partnership, if Russia could Provide a level of reassurance about the issues that concern them, and become part of the division that Russia sees in the region (10).

11. Russian relations with the West, both European and American, are going through their worst stages since they improved after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia sees it as an economic fight by the United States because of the recent support for energy transfer projects from the Caucasus to Europe. Without coordination with Moscow with the aim of extracting Asian countries from the sphere of Russian influence, and politically fighting by supporting Washington's rapprochement with the West, And encouraged the accession of Kiev to the European Union at the expense of Russia, and Ukraine was the spark of this tension, which was unprecedented dimensions of the Western desire to punish Russia for its support of the Ukrainian separatists, and annexation of the Crimea. The Western economic war Russia is trying to stifle the Russian economy. , It also feels that it may be militarily targeted by US and NATO bases deployed on the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey is well aware of Russia's geopolitical need for Ankara to be on its side, not alongside the United States, Especially in the Black Sea region, where Turkey is one of the leaders countries, and Turkey is the door of Russia's sea from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and this is a lifeline for Russia. There is a common bilateral interest in that region (11).

12 - Russia is interested in persuading Turkey not to participate in the missile shield. President Putin wants to exploit the current gap in Turkish-American positions in his favor to prevent Turkey from completing the circle of the blockade on Russia by joining the US effort in Romania and Ukraine. And the wall of the missile shield, and to restrict it in its biogeographical areas. Turkey is aware that its participation in the missile shield will make it a military target for Russia(12).

13. Moscow recognizes that NATO is tightening the pressure on it and besieging it, and prevent it from expanding westward, especially after the decision to deploy troops in the Baltic Republics in conjunction with the operation of the draft missile shield Eastern Europe in

Romania and Poland. It seems certain that the blockade and economic sanctions will continue against it in the Ukrainian file, and Moscow considers Ankara as an economic breathing lung, And a strategic lifeline to reduce the negative and painful repercussions of the Western sanctions that have besieged it since the summer of 2014, the crisis of Ukraine, especially after Turkey refused to share with Western countries to impose or apply to Russia; and by being, to a large extent, The intermediary partner for the transfer of natural gas to Europe, Russia has known that Turkey has an important geopolitical position, and is reluctant or unwilling to seriously engage in Western policy against it, and takes a clear distance from it specifically in terms of economic sanctions(13).

14. - The personality of both the Russian leaders 'Vladimir Putin' and his Turkish counterpart 'Recep Tayyip Erdogan', both of the characteristics of behavior and political convergence, are good used in the development of international relations and the production of conditions in the face of the West and the United States, President 'Putin' Understands that any Russian leader must provide buffer zones for Russia in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and President Erdogan understands that his country must become an important force in the Middle East, In order to gain influence in Europe, both feel more uneasy than the West, who approaches each other cautiously and distanced themselves from them. Both sides seem to be keenly aware of the importance of restoring relations, and of how they benefit from the mutual pragmatism they need. It's the politics of sucking Which gathers enemies and separates allies (14).

Chapter two

the determinants of contemporary Turkish-Russian relations

Although there are many motives behind the Turkish-Russian rapprochement, there are major obstacles to the development of these relations, including:

1. Turkey has no guarantees about what Russia can offer beyond the economic file. Especially in the Syrian crisis. The situation on the ground in Syria, which puts the two countries practically face-to-face through the progress of the Turkish-backed opposition and the bombing of Russian planes. Moreover, Turkey puts into account the positions of the countries supporting the Syrian opposition, Such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which may not support its rapprochement with Moscow, making the Turkish steps cautious and slow for fear of Moscow's use of rapprochement without real gains(15).

2. The US position is concerned about the Turkish-Russian rapprochement in light of the strained relations with Ankara, and the skepticism about the credibility of Russian intentions, which obliges Turkey to resolve its options on its rapprochement with Russia. If it is true that Turkey's standing with Russia might enhance its chances of becoming Pump for oil flows from the world's largest oil and gas reserves in Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan, But it is also true that the convergence also leads to the growing influence of Russia and Iran in the region, which is in contrast with the positions of the United States and its interests in the region where this convergence to the decline of US influence, which would be a loss of quality strategy, If the United States is so far unable to forgive Turkey for its failure to deny the passage of US forces from Turkey to invade Iraq in 2003, how can it

forgive her for failing to Russia, which could lead to the growing influence of Russia and Iran in the region, Therefore, the United States will not hesitate to use all its international weapons against Turkey, which is many and is to move the issue of the Kurds to undermine the stability of Turkey and then the incitement between them and neighboring countries with the help of Israel as well as the Armenian issue by adopting the Armenian claims against Turkey genocide and support their ambitions to deduct something from the territory of Turkey and also support the situation to Independence of Cyprus that refuses Turkey recognizes it, and the biggest card is the ability of the United States to blow up Turkey's ambitions and block its entry into the European Union(16).

-3.Turkey's membership in NATO and the obligations and obligations imposed by this membership on the Turkish side, which may be contrary to the Russian interests and goals on some of the issues of the region, especially in the Black Sea and Caspian region and plans to supply energy from Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, this policy may not find acceptance of Russia in the light of the Russian effort to strengthen its influence in those areas and Moscow considers Ankara's membership in the NATO threat to its security as it allows the West the possibility of using Turkish territory. In NATO is a threat to its security as it allows the West to use Turkish territory for military purposes(17).

4- The Russian-Iranian consensus on many issues has weakened the influence of the United States and Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia and has been conducive to growing relations between the two countries. They are afraid of the so-called 'Greater Turkey', which could lead to NATO's control of the region; Turkey being a member. In this alliance, the two countries sought to block the construction of a pipeline (Baku-Ceyhan) and to prevent Ankara and Washington from expanding their influence in the Caspian basin. Russia also tried to exploit the Iranian geopolitical site to counter Turkish infiltration and infiltrate funding among Islamic associations in the republics in Middle Asia(18).

5- Russia fears that President Ahmed's change in Turkish foreign policy after the so-called 'Arab Spring', is in support of Ankara to change the regimes in the region. Turkey has declared that it will not support any regime that oppresses its people and therefore demands that it be disbanded. This is the position of Russia a departure from the Turkish policy known 'reset problems and good relationship with neighbors' which was adopted, This change may have a negative impact on the interests of Russia not only in the Arab region but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey, for example, may support uprisings and revolutions that may arise against systems close to Russia in that region or allied countries such as Azerbaijan, So it is not clear to the Russian side how this new change will affect Turkish foreign policy, and hence Russia's interests.

6- Russia is also concerned about the increasing opportunities of political Islamist movements to gain power, such as in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia or elsewhere, which could increase Turkey's influence under the ruling AK Party with Islamic roots. Which would strengthen the 'Turkish model' it is leading. This could mean that Turkish influence could spread to the vital Russian sphere in

Central Asia and the Caucasus, undermine Russia's interests in the Arab region and form an active regional axis led by Turkey (19).

Chapter two

The second topic: The areas of convergence in contemporary Turkish-Russian relations

The Russian-Turkish relations are witnessing many areas of cooperation and rapprochement between the two countries. The two parties are keen to develop their relations and maintain a certain level of convergence to protect their mutual interests. The beginning of the twenty-first century marked the beginning of a breakthrough for both countries in terms of political and economic advancement. The Russian President Vladimir Putin's project since 2000 to restore Russia's economic power and influence coincided with the Justice and Development Party In 2002 to revive Turkey's regional and international standing.

Turkey is a traditional economic partner of Russia, and economic ties are the main driver of the relations between the two countries, and the pillar, which prevents them from worsening or deteriorating dramatically. And the growing economic relations between the two countries stand out in several areas, among them which are:

Energy

Russia is Turkey's main supplier of imported natural gas. Russia relies on Russia for about half of its natural gas imports. It also relies on 12 oil imports. The two countries are developing a four-line 'Turkish Torrent' natural gas project With four lines, one of which will be 15.75 billion square meters, will run from Russia to Turkey directly across the Black Sea, which will save the price of Russian gas supplies to Turkey, and other lines of 50 billion meters from Turkey to Greece to deliver Russian gas to Europe, Which will also benefit Turkey in playing the role of distributor, providing jobs and attracting funds. It also provides the opportunity to obtain natural gas directly and in larger quantities without the need for transit countries, which may contribute to the development of economic growth in the country(20).

The gas sector is always managed by Russia's Gazprom, which is largely monopolized by the state, which has benefited greatly from the rise in energy prices, at least in exports, with two-thirds of global gas wealth, And the world's first gas and gas production and export, gas may be the future sector for Russia, which also has Gazprom as the sector leader in the world, at least for reserves and production, it has about 86 Russian gas production, It has about 86% Russian gas production, or nearly 20% of the world's production(21).

The summit between the Turkish Presidents 'Erdogan' and the Russian 'Putin' in early December 2014 sign the government agreement to build the gas pipeline 'Turkish Torrent' at a cost of 12 billion dollars, and agreed on a mechanism to reduce the price of natural gas to Turkey, which it is considered as the second largest importer of Russian gas after Germany, with purchases from the Russian gas giant 'Gazprom' (27) billion cubic meters in 2013.

With the Turkish Torch project, Turkey is reaching its ambition to become a regional gas transit hub and will earn the transit fees of Russian gas supplied to Europe. Russia will finally be able to reduce its reliance on Ukraine for the

transit of gas after tensions between Moscow and keeaf have stabilized The stage of indirect armed confrontation in the Donbass region, as well as increased supplies to southern Europe (22).

Russia is currently supplying gas to Turkey via the 'Blue Nile' pipeline, which was launched at the turn of the century, and building the Blue Line 2 with the same capacity as the canceled project across the Black Sea to Samsun, Turkey and then Beria to Ankara; from there it gathers at the Turkish-Greek border, Ankara is thus turning to an eastern gateway to Russia's gas exports to Europe, which reinforces Turkey's position, which is in a European Union resolution. Some experts are also talking about the possibility of setting up a joint plant in Turkey on the Mediterranean coast to export LNG to all Europe countries(23).

Russia will achieve great geopolitical gains as well, as it will be a strong message to the West that Russia is no longer in international isolation and found an alternative to the 'Southern Stream' project, which stalled at the end of 2014 amid escalating differences between Russia and the EU, because of the Ukrainian crisis, it is noteworthy that Russia is using the gas weapon effectively, especially after the abolition of the project of the southern stream aimed at transporting gas to several European countries, such as Bulgaria, Austria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia via the Black Sea because of the European position to impose sanctions on Russia (24).

Russia and Turkey signed a memorandum of cooperation in the area of guaranteeing the safe transport of oil in the Black Sea region on May 12, 2010, during a visit by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Ankara. On May 12, 2010, signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of guaranteeing the safe transport of oil in the Black Sea region. The two parties give priority to the Samson-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, which began construction in late April 2010. The pipeline runs from northern Turkey to the south, The Russian oil will be transported from the Black Sea basin to the European markets. There are also hundreds of tankers carrying oil from the Black Sea ports on the Russian border to international markets through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (25).

The cooperation also extends to the field of electric power, which is one of the most areas of economic cooperation between the two countries, where the company 'Technostroy Export' Russian Foreign Trade in the construction of the dam and the power station 'Deriner' capacity of 670 MW, In the Turkish province of Artvin. On December 29, 2008, Inter RAO-TGR, which was established in Turkey, obtained a license to import electricity from Russia via Georgia. Moreover, energy cooperation has expanded to include energy, As the two countries look forward to continuing the Akkuyu nuclear plant, Turkey's first nuclear power plant to cover its growing power needs. Atom StrueExport is expected to receive a license to build the plant and start pouring concrete in 2018, The first unit of the plant will be operated in 2023 and completed in 2026. The Akoyo project will be realized under the BOO system. Russia currently owns 100 shares of Akoyo Nuclear Plant, Up to (49) Of the shares to investors. The total cost of the project is estimated at about \$ 20 billion. Russia spent a few billion dollars before the incident of dropping the Sukhoi-24 launcher by the Turkish Air Force on November 24,2015. The Russian Minister of

Energy, Alexander Novak, said that the project to build the first nuclear plant in Turkey, south of Mersin, will be conclusive evidence of the momentum and strength of future strategic cooperation between the two countries. Not only that On May 11, 2007, the Turkish company Atom Stroy Export and Turkey's Ergoth Construction and Trade Company signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the establishment of strategic cooperation in the commercialization of technologies for the goods, equipment and services of the atomic energy industry in Turkey (26).

Volume of trade exchange

The international trade between the two countries has played a very influential role in the conclusion of bilateral and regional agreements and overcoming tensions and events. It seems to all that the economic relationship between them is prosperous and stands on solid ground, and reflects the volume of trade exchange between the The two countries attach importance to each other, as the volume of commodity exchange between the two countries increases from year to year. The volume of trade between Turkey and Russia reached 4.5 billion dollars in 2000(27). However, relations have become more and more convergent since 2004, with the total volume of trade between the two countries reaching \$ 11 billion(28), rising to \$ 15 billion in 2005, reaching \$ 21 billion in 2006 and \$ 28 billion in 2007, To reach 37 billion dollars in 2008, to decline to 21 billion dollars in 2009 because of the global financial crisis(29)

,To fall to 21 billion dollars in 2009 because of the global financial crisis, and rose again in 2012 to reach 34 billion dollars, the volume of trade exchange of up to 33 billion dollars for 2013 (30).

The trade exchange between Moscow and Ankara in 2014 amounted to about \$ 31 billion, of which \$ 17.8 billion is Russia's exports to Turkey, where energy imports constitute the lion's share while importing vegetables, fruits, cars and textile products(31).

The volume of bilateral trade dropped to 23.3 billion dollars due to the fall in oil prices and the stagnation of the Russian economy as well as the great tension witnessed in relations between the two countries in November 2015 against the background of the drop of the Turkish army fighter Russian war violated the Turkish airspace at The border with Syria, and this incident shadow economic relations between the two countries, and in 2016 Russia imposed on the Turks a visa to enter its territory from January and the volume of trade between the two, and reduced Turkish exports to Russia by 60.5 to stand at 737 Million dollars, with the volume of trade in the period between January and September 2016 to 12 billion dollars(32).

The sanctions included several sectors, including the ban on the import of agricultural products, the prevention of the employment of Turkish workers and the imposition of a visa on Turks visiting Russia. The two sides have lost economically as a result of the tension between them, and the impact on the level of GDP for both, and to large numbers of citizens whose interests have been damaged. Trade between the two sides was high and a candidate to rise over time, and suddenly this exchange fell and the markets became scarce and exporters and importers were affected. With strained relations Between the two countries, Turkish economic losses amounted to more than 10 billion

dollars, which Turkey wants to compensate in the future(33).

The crisis between the two countries ended with the Turkish President 'Erdogan' on June 27, 2016, apologizing to Russia for dropping the Russian warplane and offered his condolences to the death of the pilot, in a gesture that described Ankara seeks to improve relations that have affected the tension with the economy of Turkey, This coincided with the desire of Moscow to improve its relationship with Ankara for the realization that the removal of Turkey more at this stage will push more towards the approach of 'NATO', especially since the previous Russian sanctions against Ankara have adversely affected the Russian economy, many Russian traders They want cheap Turkish goods, suffer from European and American sanctions and the collapse of oil prices, and eventually need to get deals available in Turkish markets.

At a meeting of the Russian government after the telephone conversation between the Russian and Turkish presidents, which is the first since the outbreak of the crisis between Moscow and Ankara, the Russian President announced the decision to start normalizing relations with Turkey, where President 'Putin' meeting to talk about the subject of resumption of cooperation With the Turkish side in the field of tourism, and asked the Prime Minister 'Dmitry Medvedev' to prepare proposals on the necessary legal amendments that will form the basis for the process of normalization(34).

The issue of the resumption of economic relations was first introduced when the Turkish president paid a visit to Moscow in August of the same year in the Russian city of Saint Petersburg after settling the issue of dropping the plane, where the Russian President 'Putin' and the Turkish President 'Erdogan', in time, to restore Strong economic relations between the two countries. President Putin said that the trade sanctions imposed by Moscow on Turkey 'will be gradually lifted,' and pointed out that the priority is to return to the level of cooperation that was before the crisis. President Erdogan 'This visit seems to me as an important stage in our bilateral relations and a new beginning from a blank page,' the Russian TASS news agency said during the visit (35).

The Turkish government plans to increase the volume of trade with Russia to 100 billion dollars after the decline that occurred as a result of the crisis, said Turkish Minister of Trade and Customs 'Bulent Tufenjji' in December 2016 that the Russian-Turkish economic relations began to return to the previous level, expressing Expressed the hope that the two countries will be able to reach the volume of trade between them to 100 billion dollars through the implementation of joint ventures between them. He explained that the two countries have taken a number of important steps towards the normalization of relations between them(36).

After the failed coup attempt in Turkey in mid-2016, relations between the two sides gained momentum, through official visits between officials of the two countries, to melt the 'iceberg' witnessed by the relationship between the two sides. Especially when comparing Turkey to the Western position (The American and the European) and the Russian position towards the coup attempt, which Turkey prepares a decisive stage in its political history; to find that the Russian position on the European position in support of the

Turkish leadership, and understanding of the concerns, and announced support for its position in the face of the attempted coup They also advance the US position they suspect Turkey is standing behind the attempt, or at least aware of it, as well as Washington's refusal to 'Obama administration' to respond to Turkey's demands to hand over Fathullah Gulen accused of plotting the coup attempt(37).

The economic partnership between the two countries was strengthened during President Putin's visit to Turkey on October 10, 2016, and participated in the 23rd World Energy Summit. , Accompanied by a large delegation of businessmen, and the two sides signed 11 cooperation agreements in various economic , Tourism and cultural activities, starting with the opening of cultural houses in both countries through the cancellation of their entry visa, and agreements in the banking, industrial and agricultural sectors, to the project of establishing a nuclear power plant as mentioned above. And a visit by the Turkish president to Russia In September 2016, during which he stressed that Ankara and Moscow are seeking to increase the volume of trade between them by 2023 to \$ 100 billion dollars (38).

These visits have contributed to raising the level of economic and trade exchanges and joint ventures, as well as enhancing cooperation in various fields and revoking visas. 'The mutual visits between the officials of the two countries contribute greatly to the promotion of bilateral relations In this regard, the two leaders welcomed the increase in the volume of trade between the two countries during the first eight months of 2017 by 21 percent compared to the same period last year(39).

Tourism

Russia was the second largest market for the tourism sector in Turkey after Germany, and Turkey's resorts are one of the best places for Russian citizens to enjoy. In 2010, Turkey had 3.1 million Russian tourists. The number of Russian tourists who arrived in Turkey in 2014 was 4.38 million Millions of the 42 million tourists who visited Turkey that year introduced an estimated \$ 36 billion into the Turkish economy, prompting the authorities of the two countries to sign an agreement to revoke their visas. This could be considered as an appropriate platform for deepening cooperation between Russia and Turkey(40).

The Turkish tourism sector was severely affected by the crisis between the two countries and the ban imposed by Russia on tourism to Turkey before raising it at the end of August 2016 after losses estimated at five billion dollars, and the number of tourists in Istanbul and Antalya fell below the average rates in Turkey. In Turkey. The hotel occupancy rate in October was 52.2, down by 14% compared to the same period last year. In 2015, this figure was 60.7% in 2014 and 63.8% in 2014. Despite the decline in Russian tourist inflows in the first 10 months of 2016 after the temporary ban on travel to Turkey following the plane crash, the rate of increase in the number of Russian tourists gradually increased by the end of the year, and Turkey wants to recover its annual revenues of the three billion dollars of tourism revenues from Russia alone, and promised the Turkish Minister of Trade and Customs 'Bulent Tufenjji' to make more efforts to establish a green corridor customs between Russia and Turkey(41).

Cooperation in the building and construction sector

Turkish construction companies have been operating in Russia since the 1990s, and during this time they have been able to participate in major projects such as the construction of the Moscow City business centre and the restoration of the Duma (parliament). Turkish construction companies have been remarkably active in the Russian market, where it cooperated with the Russian side in the construction of skyscrapers and hotels, in addition to the Turkish construction companies contributed to the construction of facilities for the World Cup to be held in Russia in 2018. A good example is the selection of the Turkish company 'Runesans' to carry out the expansion of the Chermetivu International Airport on the outskirts of Moscow at an estimated cost of more than 600 million dollars. The expansion works include a passenger terminal for domestic flights, two passenger and pleasure tunnels and others (42).

More than 150 Turkish construction companies are currently operating in Russia, and since the end of the last century, about 800 projects have been completed, with a total volume of transactions of \$ 26 billion. Turkish companies had deals in 2007 worth 4.3 billion dollar Russian companies are also building projects in Turkey. In the same context, the Russian Iron and Steel Complex 'Magnitogorskie' and the Turkish company specializing in the import of coal 'Atacash Group' signed a protocol on the construction of the steel and iron complex in Turkey, which has a production capacity of about 2.6 million tons of iron products annually. The deal is valued at \$ 1.1 billion. The active cooperation between the two countries in the field of shipbuilding has developed significantly. In 2006-2008, the shipyard 'Krasnoye Surmovo' Russian building cruise ship and two cargo ships and a Turkish tanker, characterized by excellent environmental specifications. In 2007, a contract was signed for the Russian side to set up 10 tankers with a capacity of 6.9 thousand tons for the Turkish side. In addition, Turkey provides the Russian market with 65 per cent of its imports of fruits, especially tomatoes, more than a quarter of the imported mandarin and about a quarter of imports of cucumber. And signed a number of mutual agreements between the two countries more than 60 agreements on cooperation in various fields (43).

In the field of investments, Turkish investments in Russia amounted to about 7 billion dollars in 2008 and concentrated in the sectors of construction, food, glass and electronic industries, while the Russian investments in the same year in Turkey \$ 4 billion and it was concentrated in the field of Turkish communications and energy projects (44). The Russian Energy Minister 'Alexander Novak' in August 2017, the value of investments of Turkish companies in Russia amounted to more than 10 billion dollars, compared to the same value invested by Russian companies in Turkey, 'There is broad potential for investment in various economic sectors in agriculture, industry and other fields, especially as the two heads of state have agreed to increase trade volume to 100 billion dollars,' Novak said at the Izmir International Fair (45).

It is noteworthy that the incident of dropping the Russian launcher put economic cooperation between the two countries in all areas at stake, but the apology of President 'Erdogan' resulted in the beginning of normalization gradually, and pushed the failed coup attempt in Turkey in mid-July 2016, towards further convergence. Since then,

Presidents Putin and Erdogan have held a lot of meetings. Today, relations between the two sides are undergoing a clear phase of change, which may show their effects in succession to create a modern formula for managing this relationship. Which may be a promising and attractive relationship to other cooperative relations in a region where there is a movement ready to take any direction. Currently, Russian-Turkish relations can be described as the strongest in the history of relations between the two countries, whether in politics, tourism or Cultural exchange or the economy, which is above all of the above.

Chapter three

Issues of Controversy in Contemporary Turkish-Russian Relations

There are many hot issues on the regional and international scene that put the Turkish-Russian relations to the test, due to the differences in their respective positions towards any crisis that links the two countries with interests relations within them, as the following:

1. The Syrian crisis

The conflict that has been taking place in the Syrian territories since 15 March 2011 has created a new phase of differences between Turkey and Russia on the position of each of the Syrian regime. Turkey opposed the survival of Bashar al-Assad and demanded that he step down. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he advised Assad to carry out democratic reforms in vain. As the Syrian regime began using its military forces against the protesters, Erdogan said he had fears that sectarian clashes could erupt in Syria, because of the length of the border between the two countries, and the deterioration of Syria's status and its fragmentation on ethnic and religious grounds. Neighbouring countries can become immersed in the conflict by aligning themselves with any sectarian or ethnic groups, and sees an open conflict in Syria involving foreign forces, which may have serious consequences for regional security. The Turkish role in the Syrian crisis is crystallized in three directions, first of which is the adoption of the Syrian opposition. Political support, hosting and facilitation, and allowing them to hold conferences and meetings in their cities. And secondly involving foreign forces, which may have serious consequences for regional security. The Turkish role in the Syrian crisis is crystallized in three directions, first of which is the adoption of the Syrian opposition. Political support, hosting and facilitation, and allowing them to hold conferences and meetings in their cities. And secondly by various means and methods (46).

Russia has maintained its position strongly rejecting the overthrow of the regime of President 'Bashar al-Assad' saying that he is sovereign and legitimate, and stood an international support for him and prevented the adoption of any resolution against him in the UN Security Council, and opposed any military intervention to remove him by force, and Turkey has consistently warned of its support for the Syrian armed opposition. Russia believes that Syria is a cornerstone in the security of the Middle East and that the instability of the situation or the outbreak of civil war will destabilize the situation in the regional neighboring countries, especially in Lebanon, and even difficulties in the entire region and a real threat of regional security, and therefore the situation was clearer when Russia committed to the political support, military and clear to the regime of President 'Bashar al-Assad' under calls for political and

social reform at a time when the Arab States and the United States of America events in Syria (48) In addition, there are several reasons for the Russian position on the Syrian crisis, among them:

- 1-Syria is the fourth largest importer of Russian arms.
- 2 - the existence of a naval base in the Russian port of Tartous on the Mediterranean Sea.
- 3 - Russia's negative experience in the Libyan file, and its approval of UN resolution (1973), which allowed NATO to intervene in Libya and the overthrow of the regime 'Muammar Gaddafi' one of Moscow's allies.
- 4- Syria's geostrategic location, which is a vital space for Russia on the Mediterranean Sea.
- 5- Russia's desire to establish a multipolar world order in which it is a strong actor.
- 6 - The fall of the Assad regime means tightening the screws on Iran and thus lose Russia its significant influence in the Middle East region (49).

On the basis of this is Russia's insistence on supporting the Syrian ally militarily and in security.

After the intensification of battles between the Syrian forces and the opposition groups and their proximity to the Turkish border, the Turkish position developed by inviting NATO to deploy Patriot missiles as a precautionary measure, A step Moscow rejected as unjustified. But Ankara replied that 'the deployment of the Patriot does not mean Russia because its aim is to defend the security of Turkey, and it is wrong for Russia to intervene in the matter of an internal Turkish.' Then came the biggest tension between the two countries on the Syrian crisis When Russia intervened militarily alongside the Syrian regime, and began on 30 September 2015 to launch air strikes on the sites of Syrian opposition armed supported by Ankara. The Turkish President 'Erdogan' comment on this development that these strikes 'unacceptable' and that Moscow is committing a 'grave error' this intervention, as confirmed by his prime minister at the time, 'Ahmed Daoudoglu' that the Russian intervention 'escalates the crisis' in Syria. Turkey rejects Moscow's support for Syrian Kurds which dream of establishing a state of western Kurdistan, and Ankara says it will not stand idly by, the establishment of a Kurdish state on its southern border of political taboos because the national hostility may reach the new Diyarbakir stronghold of the Kurds in Turkey.

Ankara also condemns the Russian bombardment of Mount Turkoman in western Syria. The complication of the two countries' use of the Syrian conflict and the tension in their relations was the overthrow of Turkey by the Russian fighter on November 24, 2015, when it penetrated the Turkish airspace. Where it was after warning several times to penetrate the Turkish airspace, while Russian President 'Putin' that it was dropped inside Syrian territory. President Putin warned Ankara that the incident would have 'serious repercussions.' The Russian military staff announced that all military contacts with Turkey had been cut off. Lavrov 'visit was scheduled to Turkey. In contrast, the former Turkish Prime Minister 'Oglu' that his government does not want 'strained relations with Russia because it is our friend and our neighbor'. However, he sent a strong warning message to Moscow saying that 'Turkey will not hesitate to defend itself, and It is our right and our duty to defend our violated air borders, 'stressing that his country will keep channels of communication open with Russia(50).

And after the tension between the two countries, which lasted more than six months, and the Turkish President, 'Erdogan' for new alliances in the region, especially after the failure of the Turkish effort to obtain US and European support hoped; The United States has refused to establish Safe areas inside Syria, and allied with Syria's anti-Kurdish Kurds. The Europeans have also refused to compromise on joining the European Union. NATO did not show enough interest in Turkey's support after the Russian plane was shot down, but demanded that the problem be resolved amicably Terrorism has also spread to Turkey through a series of suicide bombings. All these repercussions led to the situation of Turkey in a state of relative isolation (51). Which prompted President 'Erdogan' to submit a letter of apology for the incident of the fall of the Russian fighter to Russian President 'Putin' in June 2016 on the In the hope that this apology public access to temper the atmosphere, and improve relations, and eliminate the negative effects of the crisis with Moscow, This step was considered by analysts courageous and wise to re-normalize relations between Moscow and Ankara, which would carry with it significant changes on the level of many regional equations on issues of common interest between the two sides and the Syrian crisis, especially that it is not in the interest of Russia's withdrawal from Syria. On the other hand, Russia, in the context of strengthening its influence in the region, sought to restore relations with Turkey on the right track in light of the deterioration of Turkish-US relations, an attempt to win a new ally in the region. Where the Kremlin has decisively stood by Along with Ankara following the attempted coup d'etat in Turkey on July 15, 2016, It was reported that Russian military intelligence had conveyed to the Turkish side a warning about an impending coup. In the wake of the failed coup d'état, countries are closer, and unlike Turkey's Western partners, the Kremlin has not criticized Erdogan's wide-ranging campaign in the media and Non-governmental organizations and other institutions of Turkish society that Ankara has complicit in the attempted coup. The Russian position towards the failed coup accelerated Russian-Turkish reconciliation steps. On a visit to the Russian president, the agreement was signed to restore economic relations Formation of a bilateral committee to study cooperation in Syria(52).

The Turkish-Russian rapprochement, despite all the contradictions that exist, will find a solution to the Syrian crisis, following the abandonment of Turkey's support for the Syrian opposition and the acceptance of a peaceful solution to the existence of Assad, especially with the convergence of views of both Ankara and Tehran opposition to the establishment of a Kurdish entity in northern Syria. As the president said Ben Ali Yildirim 'Turkey and Iran know very well how to solve the problems of the region and that his country will work with Iran to resolve the Syrian crisis.' 'We have also normalized our relations with Israel and Russia, we will print our relationship with Syria,' he said in a speech to the Turkish parliament on Tuesday August 16, 2016. 'The normalization with Syria has two conditions: first, to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria and Turkey, and the second is that the new Syria will not be a sectarian state in which everyone will live without discrimination.' He was accused of 'Yildirim' The United States and Russia to seek the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Syria and

southern Turkey to separate Turkey from the Arab world. The Yildirim has confirmed in previous statements to the newspaper 'decision' Turkish approach to reach a solution to the Syrian crisis and the form of the solution includes three steps are 'protection of borders, and not allow the establishment of a state controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, and the return of refugees residing in neighboring countries to After achieving the final solution '. The new Turkish position, which Ankara said was in the interest of its interests, represents a departure from the traditional Turkish position which it has been repeating for years. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must leave power in the framework of any political solution to the Syrian crisis(53).

It seems that the mutual economic interests have played a role in encouraging the parties to seek again to find a way out of the Syrian crisis, where President Putin said that Turkey and his country stand by the cessation of bloodshed in Syria as soon as possible. This came at a joint press conference, With the Turkish president, 'Erdogan', following a closed-door meeting took place between them in Istanbul, which he visited to participate in the work of the 23rd World Conference on Energy in October 2016, and added that his country wants access Syria to stage a political solution soon, and that he agreed with the President 'Erdogan' to make every effort to secure the transfer of humanitarian aid to the city of Aleppo, and stressed the need to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and that the issue of evacuation of the area of the Castillo road (which leads to the city of Aleppo), Will be put forward by his country during the talks in the city of Lausanne (Switzerland). The Russian president indicated that he agreed with his Turkish counterpart on the joint efforts to exclude the armed groups in accordance with the recommendation of the UN envoy to Syria, 'Stephan de Mistura,' to stop The bloodshed in Aleppo. On the other hand, the Turkish President 'Erdogan' that he discussed with his Russian counterpart, 'Putin', the situation in Aleppo, including the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians, pointing to high-level meetings between the two countries to agree on a certain point on those situations(54).

Turkish-Russian cooperation on the ground in Syria has shown significant development and a prediction of the prospects for regional powers to build relations in the absence of the United States or send conflicting messages to their international partners. In December 2006, Turkey, which opposed 'Bashar al-Assad', sided with Turkey from the start To the ranks of the Syrian armed forces, supported by the Russian air force, to restore Aleppo. Russia is also leading international diplomatic efforts to reconcile the interests of many opposing agents and groups fighting on the ground. Russia also clearly intends to remain in the region. This is one of the reasons why Turkey will work with it more than the United States(55). Despite the complexity of the scene, the Russian-Turkish understanding, if it is achieved, can play an important role in ending the fighting in Syria; this is due to the great influence it has The great influence of the Russians and Turks in the parties to the Syrian and regional conflict, especially with the emergence of a kind of international consensus and regional that the crisis must be ended, which affected everyone to varying degrees.

2. - The position of the ruling regime in Egypt

since the overthrow of the army in Egypt, the elected civilian president, 'Mohamed Morsi' on July 3, 2013 Turkey has taken a strong political stance than what happened, and is the position of the Turkish government that the occurrence of a military coup is unacceptable and can not be tolerated, Keeping Egypt on the democratic track is a vital interest for the region and for the world, and it urged the international community to renounce the coup to consolidate their regional and international isolation and to delegitimize the current president, 'Abdelfattah al-Sisi (56).

On the other hand, Russia sees it from other angles It supported the events and began to strengthen its relations with the new regime in Egypt in order to fill the vacuum in line with its interests. The Sisi was given financial and moral support, As well as the exchange of visits between them, has received the Russian President 'Abdul Fattah al-Sisi', and visited President 'Putin' Cairo in February 2015, and signed bilateral agreements in the fields of military and economic; and believed that Russia uses its relations with the regime in Egypt to prove the success of the 'Arab spring revolutions', because the success of the revolution in Egypt is to encourage its success in Syria, which is not wanted by Russia, and is working to convince Turkey of these ideas in order for the latter to change its policies towards Syria. But Turkey is determined to its position, President Erdogan stressed In a conference he held with the Russian President that 'Mohamed Morsi' is the legitimate president of Egypt and does not support the Russian view on Egypt (57).

3.Ukraine crisis

The Ukrainian crisis, known as the 'Crimean crisis', following the Ukrainian revolution in 2014 that toppled President Viktor Yanukovich and his government, protesters, most of them of Russian nationalism, protested against the events in Kiev and asked for more and sought more integration with Russia, in addition to expanded autonomy or independence of the Crimea for Ukraine. On the other hand, other ethnic groups demonstrated to support the revolution. On February 27, 2014, gunmen wearing Russian military uniforms occupied important facilities in the Crimea. Kiev accused Moscow interfered in its internal affairs, while the Russian party denied these allegations. Since 1 March of the same year, There is no doubt that the Russian forces are active in the Crimea, and that these forces, supported by the people of the Russian peninsula, who represent the majority of the population, took control of the major airports, and moved these forces even before the Russian Parliament and the Federal Council of Russia The Federal Council of the Russian Federation authorized Putin to use force in Ukraine, 'if the situation required it.' At the same time, pro-Russian forces occupied the parliament of the peninsula, and parliament quickly overthrew the local government, forming a new government loyal to the Federal Council of the Russian Federation authorized Putin to use force in Ukraine, 'if the situation required it.' At the same time, pro-Russian forces occupied the parliament of the peninsula, and parliament quickly overthrew the local government, forming a new government loyal to Moscow; it also announced its control over all institutions and security forces in the Crimea. In a landmark move, the Crimean parliament called for a referendum on the fate of the peninsula. On March 16, 2014 a referendum was held in the Crimea for separation

from Ukraine and accession to the Russian Federation, was the result of Wallace In favor of accession to Russia (95%) (58).

The Turkish position was included in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. It was neutral in the beginning, and called for political dialogue, a quick solution to the problem and the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but then with the support of the West and the United States in the face of Russian Through this pro-Western stance, Turkey seeks the satisfaction of the West and the United States of America, which are critical of Turkey's internal politics. Turkey believes that the referendum held in the Crimean Autonomous Republic within Ukraine 'illegal', and that the solution of the crisis Which is taking place in Ukraine through the fulfillment of the obligations of international law and bilateral and multilateral agreements, as well as its demand for intervention by the Security Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Ministers of the European Union to resolve the crisis(59).

Turkey's position on the territorial integrity of Ukraine is the result of its rejection of any Russian military intervention to separate the Crimea. Russia's control of the peninsula is a radical change in the strategic balance of the Black Sea and a threat to Turkey's national security. , As the Crimea is the region closest to Turkey in the north of the Black Sea, which has been a decisive pre-emptive position Against Russian intervention in Ukraine, in which Turkey sees a natural buffer zone with Russia. In addition to working with all force to support the historical presence of Crimean Tatars, and try to prevent the transformation of their region to the arena of wrestling with world powers (60).

The Ukrainian crisis has led Turkey to be between two dilemmas concerning economic relations with Russia, geopolitical relations with the EU, Turkey's recent rapprochement with Russia, and several economic and trade agreements with Moscow. Turkey is not a member of the European Union on the one hand and does not intend to impose sanctions on Russia, since its present position provides it with great economic opportunities with Russia. Russia has stopped importing food from Europe because of sanctions imposed by the Ukrainian crisis and opened the door to import from Turkey. With an emphasis on the official Turkish position in support of the Tatar question, recognition of the rights of the people of Tatar, the Crimea, And to ask the Russian side to comply with international laws(61).

Turkey has preferred not to raise problems with its neighbors, which has borne fruit in relations with both Russia and Ukraine at the same time, in order to preserve Turkey's regional balance in Europe, gain American support by and maintain economic gains with Russia, Which supports the future plans of the Justice and Development Government, but at the same time issuing warnings about Russian expansion. In contrast Russia's intervention in the Ukrainian crisis has had several reasons for political, strategic, economic; politically, the new strategy of Putin 'to rebuild the Russian role as a world power and to restore its status, which is almost finished after the cold war, and requires Russia to intervene, as it considers that Ukraine is a country and an extension of its colonies, a historical and geographical right and it is

unacceptable to intervene Particularly in the case of strong influence by the Western powers represented by the United States and the European Union(62).

Strategically, the European attraction of Ukraine and the fear of annexing it to the EU after the establishment of a free trade zone with it as a step to annex it to NATO poses a threat to Russian interests. This is unacceptable. Russia can not become NATO. A short distance from its territory and this is not in line with the new strategic vision of Russian President 'Putin'. As a result of this vision, it is natural for Russia to begin extending its influence to its neighbouring countries, especially with common interests and a single historical background(63).

On the economic front, Russia is the main source of energy supply to Ukraine. It is one of the largest consumers of Russian energy in Europe and relies on Russian natural gas. Ukraine produces only 16% of the natural gas. Of domestic demand, while the rest depends mainly on imports from Russia, as well as the large commercial market between the two countries. Russia imports machinery engines, train vehicles, and machinery, as well as importing Ukrainian agricultural products such as sugar and materials and also Ukraine is also the gateway President of Russia to pass the Russian gas to Europe In addition to Ukraine's port on the Black Sea, commercial transport between the two countries is facilitated through it, which is of economic importance to Russia. Therefore Russia had to intervene to protect its economic interests 'vital and strategic' in the region. It can be concluded that it is Ukraine that creates the image of Russia as a superpower or that breaks this picture, and that Russia without Ukraine is just a country while Russia with Ukraine is an empire(64).

It can be concluded that it is Ukraine that creates the image of Russia as a superpower or that breaks this picture, and that Russia without Ukraine is just a country while Russia with Ukraine is an empire.

4. Georgia

known as the 'five-day war', officially began on August 8, 2008 with a military attack from Georgia on the provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after which the Russian forces launched a quick counterattack on the two provinces, and then Georgia. The relationship has been strained for decades between South Ossetia and Georgia, with the latter demanding independence from the Soviet Union and who rejected it. The Russian invasion of Georgia and the control of Ossetia and Abkhazia did not favor Turkey, which had special relations with its neighbor Georgia, and solidarity with it, where the Abkhaz community. It is also the place where the Azeri oil pipeline passes to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, as well as the railway line linking Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey sees this relationship as an important balancing element in supporting its relations with the Caucasus countries. Turkey found itself in a difficult position when the Russians invaded Georgia, and despite Turkey's attempt to adopt a neutral approach in this crisis, it is difficult for Turkey to succeed in adhering to Neutrally with a future crisis. It should be noted that Turkey has put forward a project calling for the formation of a multilateral alliance and poles of cooperation, partnership and security in the Caucasus region aimed at reducing the effects of the Russian confrontation with the West on its strategic interests, As well as its role in bringing together the neighboring countries under the umbrella of understanding

and developing common perceptions for maintaining stability in the region(65).

5.Armenia

that the Russian-Turkish rapprochement will be positively and negatively affected by the position of the two countries of the issues of disagreement between them, including the tense relations between Turkey and Armenia; due to a number of historical and political issues, including the Armenian genocide, and the continuing attempts by Turkey to deny it. The President, 'Erdogan' inviting the Armenians during his visit to Colombia in February 2015, pointing out that ('our hand stayed in the air', and so is Armenia always, since gaining independence, Turkey occasionally extends its hand to it, but it creates The excuses of turkey In order to evade, our hand remains in the suspended air. This happened even at the best stages experienced by the relations between Turkey and Armenia during the era of 'Petrosian', even in that era was Armenia step forward and then back down two steps, 'Petrosian' visited former Turkish President 'Uzal', And they took some of the most beautiful pictures, and when he returned to his country continued in his previous policy, and after the earthquake in Armenia, which occurred in 1988, which killed 25 thousand people, Turkey provided all its assistance, and opened an air corridor to aid Armenia and its people, Turkey has provided all its aid and has opened an air corridor to relief Armenia and its people. Turkey has also accepted Armenia into the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, although there are no beaches on the Black Sea, In order to provide Turkey proof of good intentions, not only Turkey, but the former President 'Abdullah Gul' visit Yerevan, to watch a football match there to bury the hatred and hatred forever, but that all did not benefit, did not benefit and will not Useful, past experiences to Prove it). Turkey is accusing Russia of obstructing the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations. To think abstractly and to look directly at the relations of Ankara and Yerevan is very wrong, because there is no real Armenian state in the Caucasus, but there is a structure with fully protected borders Fully by Russia, Armenia today is an area under full Russian control. The heads of state of Armenia used to be their first foreign visit to Moscow, and what the Russians are asking them to do with the letter, Russia does not want a stable situation in the Caucasus. Russia is not seeking to lose Control over the guard of its interests in the Caucasus, Armenia, This is because other countries such as Georgia are under Western control, so Russia is trying at every opportunity to impede any possible rapprochement between the West and Armenia, so the biggest obstacle to the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia is Russia(66). It is noteworthy that the 'Russian State Duma' has started in April 2005 began a law that the Ottomans were responsible for the 'genocide of the Ottoman Armenians' in 1915, which Turkey expressed resentment (67).

6.Nagorno-Karabakh

renewed the conflict in the region more than once, most recently on April 2, 2016 as the strongest military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia 22 years ago, during the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia provided direct military assistance to the latter while Turkey supported Azerbaijan and closed the border of Turkish-Armenian, if not actively involved in the war. Later, over many years, relations on both sides of the

conflict deepened so that the axis of Turkey-Azerbaijan could be talked about and Georgia, to a lesser degree, joined the Russian-Armenian axis and Iran was to a lesser degree. Turkey is formulating its position on the conflict according to a complex system of religious, historical, ethnic and economic and political interests, the most important of which is its moral and historical responsibility towards the Azeri people, derived from the history of the Ottoman Empire, Which combines with Azerbaijan the participants of religion, language and race, making the relationship with them sensitive and pivotal, epitomized by the famous sentence repeated by politicians on both sides 'one people in two states'.(68)

The present situation of Nagorny Karabakh, as a matter of dispute, affects Turkey's policies vis-à-vis the Balkans and the Caucasus. It limits its effectiveness in the Adriatic and Caspian regions directly, in contrast Russia, which draws its approach to the conflict on several grounds, The most important of which is the competition for natural gas basins in the Caspian Sea and its route to Europe. Armenia is also a strategic partner of Russia, politically, militarily and economically, as well as Russia's historical legacy in controlling the region in the czarist Russia and the Soviet Union, And the South Caucasus (Armenia-Azerbaijan-Georgia) region is a strategic depth for Russia and a backyard that can not be compromised by its stability and security(69).

Based on the above, the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties share accusations of responsibility for the recent sudden escalation and simultaneous at the level of existing alliances: 1.Turkey's support for Azerbaijani military formations in the autonomous region of Nahchivan, which has been assembled since 2013 under the name of the Joint Special Army. 2. Initiate joint and periodic meetings of defence ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia since 2014.

3. The Commander of the Turkish Special Forces Zakai-Akzakali visited the Azerbaijani forces on the front with Armenia in November 2014 and photographed the media as he tried a sniper rifle in a clear message of Balko's explicit support for Baku(70).

4.Turkish-Azerbaijani agreement to close the date of the opening of the Tanab project to supply Turkey with Azeri natural gas and through it to Europe, so that Turkey's share will increase from 7 billion cubic meters to 31 billion cubic meters by 2026. The entry of the project into operation and production will mean the decline of Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas, in addition to an additional decline in its world price, two developments that are very harmful to Russian energy security and the Armenian role in the energy lines. So the head of the Union of International Energy Economy 'GorkancomparOglu 'that the escalation relates to the gas pipeline to Europe after more years than the region itself(71).

5. Organizing the 'Torres' air exercises between Turkey and Azerbaijan in August and September 2015, and the Saqr Turaz maneuver in March 2016.

6. In November 2015, the President of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Baku Sahakian, invited Russia to use Stepanakert Airport In the provincial capital of The Territory for purposes related to 'counter-terrorism'. 7. Armenia signed an agreement with Russia that would include the unification of the air defense systems of the two countries under a 'joint command' in December 2015(72).

8. Russia increased the number of its combat aircraft and soldiers at bases in Armenia, especially the Guomari base near Turkey in December 2015, adding to previous increases and developments since 2010 (73).

These include fighter jets MiG-29 and Sukhoi SS-26, which in theory could target the Turkish military divisions in eastern Anatolia, as well as the MNF-M Treaty with the United States(74).

9. The resumption of clashes coincided with the presence of the Azeri and Armenian presidents in Washington at the nuclear energy security summit, which was absent from Moscow, and the meeting of former US Secretary of State 'John Kerry' with each of them separately to discuss ways to solve the problem of the region; Which can promise a message from the United States to Russia, from the point of non-interference and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, not closer relations with them, especially since Russia's military intervention in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, on the background of the pursuit of these countries to strengthen their relations with the West (75).

The eruption of clashes again between Armenia and Azerbaijan, about 22 years after the end of the war between them because of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh clearly indicates the role of regional and global states supporting the conflicting parties in the field - both stimulating and discouraging, but the relationship Between the supporting countries and the local crisis may sometimes react in the opposite direction, extending the limited local conflict into a regional or global confrontation, as happened in historical examples, first and foremost the First World War. When the clashes continue at a certain level, the cat can not be reached A regional military confrontation at any time when the circumstances of the domestic confrontation may deviate from the line drawn up, spontaneously or by the planning of a party.

7. The independence of Kosovo

contradicts the Turkish and Russian position on the problem of the independence of Kosovo. Turkey was sympathetic to Kosovo's orientation towards independence. In March 2007, it supported the peace plan presented by the UN Special Envoy, Which gave Kosovo independence under the auspices of an international mission sponsored by the European Union(76). Russia strongly criticized the plan, criticized Western countries and Turkey and said it would use the veto if it were presented to the UN Security Council for a vote. And at an extraordinary meeting held for the Kosovo Parliament on 17 February 2008, , The head of the Kosovo independence council recognized by Turkey, while Russia has declared that this unilateral independence is null and void and that it is contrary to the UN Charter, it is afraid to strengthen the military presence on its borders and expand the NATO alliance to the east, Despite the alliance's assertion that its expansion is not aimed at it, but sees, as stated by Foreign Minister Lavrov, that the concrete facts differ from the stated intentions. It is known that Russia is linked to the state of Serbia economic interests reflected by trade agreements through which Russia simplifies Russia controls the energy sector in the region, and Serbia is an economic gateway to Russia in European space, and independence of Kosovo, of course, negatively affects Russian interests(77).

CONCLUSION

It may seem to some that the rapprochement in contemporary Turkish-Russian relations does not necessarily mean a change in the foreign policy positions of both Turkey and Will continue their differences in those files. However, the recent acceleration of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement proves that Turkey alone does not have the strength to solve all the problems, nor can Russia ignore the Turkish presence and influence in the region's conflicts in general, which will open the horizon Russia, and that the two countries' policies on controversial issues will not change and that they A greater level of serious dialogue so as not to be affected by the areas of convergence and agreement. The high level of intertwining of the current Turkish-Russian relations in the economic fields will create a kind of interdependence and common interests that necessitate the continuation of the relationship between the two countries And the failure to reach a zero-sum conflict because of direct tensions over various controversial issues. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the nature of the contemporary Turkish-Russian relationship is moving in a wide space dominated by a package of common geostrategic interests and that the two countries do not have the luxury of allowing hostile relations between them.

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