

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS ON THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEFENSE SECTOR. (A REVIEW).

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ABSTRACT: *The economy is a universal factor for the survival of an individual, a family, an organization, or a nation. The need for economic development serves as a motivating force to activate the production sectors of a state to achieve the best-civilized environment leading to prosperity. From the perspective of the geopolitical and geosocial situation the world over, this paper aims to expound on Pakistan's economic growth with a special reference to developing strategies to date for the growth of our defense sector. Endangered by strained relations with our neighbors' demands our defense sector to protect our porous and vulnerable borders. Trapped in a triangle of international political tug-of-war between America, Russia, and China, developing countries like Pakistan desperately struggle to balance relations with these countries to secure their development programs. Yet, with the least success in this scenario, Pakistan has no option except to significantly enhance its defense potential independently at the expense of the development budget. Particularly in the wake of the threats from India's aggressive designs, pressure on our defense budget is inevitable. The volatile situation in Afghanistan and strained relations with Iran have further cornered Pakistan to bear the brunt. Eventually, in the pursuit of its defense spending, there is no option except to slice the development budget leading to an unhealthy brewing of socio-political socio-economic issues to haunt Pakistan. The situation is not confined to Pakistan, rather on a global scale the developing and underdeveloped world has been spending Trillions of dollars to cope with the catastrophic situation in world politics, pressurizing the development budget of the underprivileged countries. In a way, the financial grants the developed countries award to the underdeveloped by direct or indirect means under the United Nations programs, a large chunk of this aid goes back to their purse when the underdeveloped countries buy defense equipment from the developed countries. Privileged countries earn billions of dollars from the sales of weapons and associated equipment to the third world. This paper thus makes the case that in this scenario improvement in our defense-related industrial sector for self-reliance is the only option to fortify our economy. and thus bringing in millions of dollars from the sale of our weapons abroad. This could ultimately ensure Pakistan's security independent of foreign aid while also lessening the political clout that major powers wield over the country. To achieve the goal, effective planning needed to be aggressively pursued to counter the economic challenges.*

Keywords: Security, Defense spending, Economic growth

INTRODUCTION

The utter failure of establishing democratic institutions by the politicians from 1947-1958 the civil rule made an unprecedented mockery of the democratic institutions leading to a serious decline in almost all production sectors endangering the economic future of Pakistan. Eventually, the political acrobatics leading to turbulence of its kind in the economic agenda during this period, culminated to suck in the forces to govern the country. The first coup occurred in 1958, overwhelmingly supported by the masses when people heaved a sigh of relief. The development that is worth mentioning during this period, extended to about eleven years, which pulled the country out of economic crises and administrative flop. This was a period of transformation from a parliamentary system to a presidential form of government. That development in this era includes i) the Construction of dams for power ii) the agricultural policy to be self-sufficient in food, iii) the Construction of Islamabad as capital to safeguard the assets of Pakistan against all odds, iv) strengthening our defense potential, that helped us survive 1965 war against India, v) Introduction of a political system of basic democracies, vi) devolution of political powers to grass root level vi) establishment of one unit to curb the sore of provincialism and racialism. In short, the implementation of policies during this era the economic prosperity surged and that enabled Pakistan, not only to be self-sufficient in the defense sector but also to extend financial support to other

countries like Germany, South Korea, etc., vii) last but not least, the consistency and stability of commercial sector of common commodities, a matter of public interest, provided enough space for the people to breath in conducive environments. So much so, the international social and electronic media paying tributes portrayed Pakistan as a "model developing state in Southeast Asia". However, this regime could not survive beyond 1958.

After some political turbulence followed by agitations, , Field Marshal Ayub Khan deposed followed by a tragic period of General Yhaya Khan, when we lost the eastern wing of Pakistan. Aftermaths of this demoralizing incident, another civil rule, headed by a political stakeholder Zulfikar Aki Bhutto, a find of Ayub Khan and an abetter of General Yahya Khan assumed charge as a chief executive. Overambitious with the implementation of his fake socialism manifesto, his nationalization policy hit a fatal blow on the economy of the state. All our production units collapsed leading to economic chaos. His revolution strategy promoted vandalism rather than socialism.

However, after some political upheavals, his regime came to an end, with the worst blow on the economy of the country, followed by another regime headed by General Zia ul Haq who ruled for about ten years reestablishing economic stability to some extent. This military coup terminated after an air crash that paved the way for another civil rule.

The next period of civil rule that followed is nothing but a tale of family-based domesticated politics, a period of musical chairs between two contestants namely Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, a period of evolution of criminal activities and opportunities of breeding social and moral crimes. The periods when the economy crumbled to a dead level with total dependence on IMF and World Bank loans. The irreparable damage inflicted on the economy during these periods lingers on to date.

In short, the country fell victim to the mafia and the economy reached a point of no return. These dark periods of our political history closed incidentally by the entry of another military rule of General Pervez Musharaf whose economic policies provided some relief to the economy.

The existing economic debacle with terrifying features is the extension of those past periods of civil rule.

Comparative economic system.

Thus, to analyze the role of the defense sector in Pakistan's economy, we first go over the concepts of economic growth and development in the context of comparative economic systems.

The comparison of Pakistan's economy under military and civilian regimes does not justify military rule yet there is no other alternative force to fill the vacuum created by the civil rules.

DEFENSE SECTOR STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES.

Pakistan has maintained an India-centric defense posture and, therefore, military expenditures since independence. However, India has accused China of starting the South Asian conventional and nuclear weapons race. A persistent arms race has been sparked in the subcontinent by distrust, threat perception, and security issues. Both India and Pakistan are mired in hardware myopia, which calls for conventional military concepts and methods to achieve national security [2]. As a result, in recent decades, expenditures for building military-industrial complexes and military spending have risen. Pakistan's declining economy has resulted in a significant increase in India's military expenditures since the turn of the twenty-first century [3]. Real military spending has increased as a result of India's expanding economy. According to reports, India is investing between \$100 and \$150 billion between 2012 and 2021[4] on new weapons and other military hardware. These expenditures are now being implemented and planned.

Significantly, it was predicted that global military spending in 2012 amounted to \$1756 billion, or 2.5 percent of GDP worldwide or \$249 per person. Between the conclusion of World War II and 2010 [5], the total is greater than in any previous year. Billions of dollars have been spent on the armaments trade out of that total. Due to their slow-developing domestic weapons industries, Pakistan and India are significant arms importers [6]. Examining the potential for Pakistan to best use its defense sector and, in turn, investigate and apply the revolution in military affairs (RMA) to achieve a higher level of economic development would be helpful.

Because of the ongoing conflict between domestic socioeconomic needs and defense and foreign policy imperatives, the effects of defense spending on economic

growth are still debatable, particularly in developing nations with lingering strategic and military irritant issues. Pakistan's history has shown that the development of defense forces is the first duty of every government, as it guarantees the country's existence, sovereignty, and advancement of its interests. The topic of "how much (defense spending) is enough" is still relevant today. The defense and strategic experts have been finding it difficult to provide a coherent response to this query. Nevertheless, the matter is still divisive in light of the war-torn developing nations that must direct vital developmental funds into the defense sector.

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effects of defense expenditure on the expansion of the national economy. Furthermore, an attempt would be made to pinpoint the merits and demerits of defense expenditure and suggest ways to lessen them. It will also investigate if Pakistan's economic development can be aided by defense expenditure. There are three components to the research. The study's conceptual structures are covered in the first part. The link between defense expenditure and the nation's economic development is elucidated in the second part. A discussion of Pakistan's defense budget and its relationship to the country's economic expansion may be found in the third part.

Economic Growth and The Development Process

Poor countries work hard to close the gap with affluent countries, but it is a difficult option. Pakistan inherits this difficulty in many ways, some of which are evident and some of which are not, as this paper highlights. We begin with a few observations on China, which is the subject of the most recent "miracle" in economic growth, and we look at the potential lessons this may have for an economy aligned with political and social issues.

Each year, the global defense industry brings in billions of dollars. As part of Pakistan's independence, there are efforts to indigenize the military sector. It was anticipated that Pakistan's defense industry would provide equipment valued at \$ 6.3 billion by 2009, reaching a total of \$ 10.4 billion by 2015. Most of the things were produced to meet the home needs of the defense sector. Pakistan has used a self-assured method in its defense activities. A plan to reduce the present capacity of defense industrial facilities to encourage the export of weapons has been in place since 2002. As a consequence, the nation's weaponry exports increased by 650 percent to \$300 million in 2012, more than trebling from \$100 million in 2006 and \$40 million in 2000 [7].

In Pakistan, however, the defense industry provides social sector-related services that boost economic development, along with health, education, transportation, and communication. For the reasons listed above, governments may make the case that they should increase defense spending. According to one research, rising defense expenditure via inflation promotes economic growth, particularly in countries like Pakistan with limited resources.

Arguments in Favor of Military Spending and Economic Growth

strategists contend that maintaining a force that is suitably sized, trained, and equipped to discourage, and deter, a wide range of potential enemies is a realistic approach to national security [8]. This viewpoint holds that all other financial, developmental, and economic benefits seem fragile if military

stability is jeopardized. Furthermore, apart from conservatives, other cosmopolitan scholars also suggest that for resource-unconstrained governments, defense expenditure might contribute significantly to development because of their other advantageous features (industrial connections, education, etc.) [9]. Benoit used a simple regression analysis to track the relationship between the growth rate of the civilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the defense burden, or the ratio of defense expenditures to GDP, and concluded that defense spending had a positive influence on GDP. A state's level of skilled labor is raised by the training provided by the defense industry to both civilians and uniformed personnel. They will probably continue to support the civilian economy even after leaving the defense industry. This effect is particularly noticeable in developing nations, where there are either inadequate or poor civilian technical training institutes to provide candidates with vocational training. By leveraging the previously established defense sector, the military's educational institutions have had a multiplier impact on higher literacy rates, social and economic growth, and vocational training.

Second, one way that funds allocated to the defense sector might wind up helping state economies reference to the production of defense industries as of Wah, in the long run, is via engineering projects having many civilian applications, such as public infrastructure projects. Rural and less populated areas of the LDCs, where civilian administrations lack the incentive and means to invest, stand to benefit the most from these programs.

Third, taking into account the inflationary pressures, defense expenditure could be able to cause inflation to somewhat contain itself while encouraging greater use of the productive capacity while the security effects come in fourth. Paradoxically, protecting themselves from outside threats and upholding internal law and order are two of the emerging countries (Pakistan & India) key concerns. Generally, in governments like Pakistan, a well-trained military may first provide support to the civil security groups. In addition to these four domains, armies with sophisticated technology capabilities could be able to play a role in giving governments a better standing in the international system of hierarchy, therefore giving them more political clout in the political sphere. The political elite in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) often use military technological advancements to improve their status in domestic politics. One area in which the military thrives and contributes to the social development of the states, hence boosting the services sector of the economy, is the provision of high-quality health care to both uniformed and non-uniformed people in the LDCs.

It is believed that increasing military expenditure would increase demand, which will lead to greater job possibilities, particularly in less developed nations. Because of this, proponents of Military Keynes theory contend that increased defense expenditure increases aggregate demand, which raises national production in light of unemployment in the economy. Higher military expenditure, however, can cause unrest or be linked to balance of payments issues in an economy with full employment [10]. The Military Keynesian Hypothesis (MKH) school of thought contends that since

defense spending is a portion of total budgetary outlays and is subject to significant discretionary control by the government, it not only promotes economic growth but also has the potential to be a tool for fiscal stabilization [11]. Looney conjectured, based on MKH, that Pakistan's defense spending serves as a stabilizing mechanism, particularly in times of more calm relations with India [12].

In the last seventy years or more, researchers have found some elements that might break the vicious cycles that result in poor economic development and start a trajectory toward high and sustainable growth; one of the more recent ones is governance [13]. All methods of identifying growth constraints, such as cross-country growth regressions, growth accounting, or benchmarking using cross-country surveys that rank nations based on a variety of criteria, including business constraints, are problematic when arguing for growth diagnostics. Theoretically, these approaches are rejected; in the case of benchmarking, this is due to intrinsic issues with the data-collecting process. However, as noted by Dixit [14] and Khan [15], growth diagnostics, the newest instrument in this armory, is similarly problematic in several ways. Case studies have been more encouraging. One lesson is that there is no one method to break out of a vicious cycle and turn it into a virtuous one. Moreover, nations that have been able to achieve and maintain rapid economic development did so via varied means and under different conditions.

Regarding the prerequisites for economic "take off," Rostow thought [16]. Although he purportedly produced an anti-communist manifesto, Mao Tse-Tung's ideas are implicitly similar to his stages of development framework [17]. Pre-conditions for take-off, according to Rostow, are the crucial phase that precedes economic take-off. These prerequisites include training to function in disciplinary organizations and a shift in perspective toward basic and applied science. The growth of monetary, political, and social institutions are further prerequisites. Management expertise and the proper social and physical infrastructure (roads, docks, trains, and ports) are prerequisites for institutional growth.

According to Mao Tse-Tung [17], a take-off is characterized by quantification first, followed by a qualitative leap, where quantification serves as the prerequisite and the take-off as the breakthrough. Mao also refers to external and internal factors, referring to the former as the more important preconditions and the latter as potential catalysts, such as a positive international environment. In the case of China and maybe other developing economies like Brazil and India, there has been a "take off" or catch-up growth, as described by many scholars. This was also the situation in Japan, Korea, Taiwan (Province of China), Malaysia, and Thailand before their emergence.

Although there is enough proof that qualitative changes have a place, we still don't fully understand what causes them or why. Furthermore, there's a good chance that each nation has different crucial internal and external variables. In this paper, we conjecture what the crucial internal circumstances in Pakistan's situation are probably. Considering our desire for social justice, we qualify. While a "take-off" is a sufficient requirement, it is not a required one for widespread well-being, as we are seeing in China and India at the moment.

Distribution opportunities and challenges might arise from a take-off. The more plausible explanation is that prosperity grows as a result of people fighting for a bigger piece of the pie (as seen in worker strikes in China) or the state distributing wealth because not doing so would likely lead to social unrest and other growth-restraining factors (as seen in China's efforts to address the country's lagging rural income with infrastructure). Additionally, employees don't always wait for a steady takeoff. Workers in Bangladesh's ready-made garment industry, which accounts for more than four-fifths of all merchandise export revenue, have been fighting for higher pay for a long time. Workers often endure a fight akin to that of countries, which must strive and grow despite all obstacles.

Within the framework of Mao's thought, strong citizen identification with a shared national objective and competent administration and administrative ability are among the most favorable internal circumstances. During the height of the swine flu pandemic, in the summer of 2009, I traveled to Beijing Language and Cultural University (BCLU) to deliver a series of lectures on economic growth. It seemed odd to be giving a lecture on economic growth in a nation that one ought to be studying. One set of lessons about managerial and administrative competence was learned very early in the trip—even before we arrived at the hotel from the airport.

Passengers traveling to China were met with a big notice upon disembarking in Islamabad, Pakistan, advising them to contact the Ministry of Health if they were arriving from a nation where the flu was first discovered or where the prevalence was high. The fact that the sign was noticeable and hard to miss is the finest thing he could say about this public health campaign. That a large number of passengers reported to the Ministry of Health the next day, however, does not seem plausible.

When the jet arrived in China two days later, the public health concern was quite different. The passengers were advised to stay seated until the jet came to a full halt. A group of public health professionals quickly and carefully took each passenger's temperature using an electronic scan. Passengers whose temperature rose beyond a certain level had their seat numbers recorded and were then tested again. That day, we heard that the mayor of New Orleans had been declared a public health danger and had been placed under quarantine in a Shanghai hotel for a week. At BCLU, foreign faculty members were prohibited from interacting with students for a week. Consequently, staff and their families were provided with scheduled sightseeing trips, or they may choose to do it independently, provided that they were provided with board and accommodation.

Additional experiences also showed a very high degree of public health awareness and the ability to take universal preventative action. When a customer sneezed, taxi drivers would often pull down their windows, indicating a successful public health campaign. A family member's scratchy throat developed into a cold in Qingdao, which is located on the Yellow Sea, 882 kilometers south of Beijing. By examining a graphic card displaying apparent cold symptoms, a traditional medicine shop provided the medication for the patient's cold. It was requested that a hotel receptionist who spoke English read the dose. Not long after this appointment, we had a

knock on our hotel room door from a public health officer to take our temperature.

Being a foreigner living in Chinese culture without any language skills made all of these public health precautions more obvious. With access to the language and media, more information may have been discovered. Nevertheless, there was an extraordinary amount of public health preparation, both in terms of official coordination and information dissemination—possibly via media efforts.

Maybe the communist party's capacity for management and administration produces the noted degree of societal efficiency. On the other hand, it also seems that there is widespread identification with what one might consider a shared endeavor to catch up to the West as quickly as possible, as an observer and interested reader of the Chinese scene. Although many people may consider China's space program to be untimely and wasteful, the media's portrayal of the country's delight in its first human space voyage did not seem manufactured. If development is a matter requiring communal action, China seems to have this necessary component for the realization of collective action. A nation the size of China is unavoidably complicated, with many people feeling poorly treated and human rights being violated. However, there seems to be a more comprehensive narrative of a nation in transition, one with sufficient management and administrative capabilities, and one where a national project is widely recognized.

These two essential components alone could be enough to start a positive spiral that releases other elements, which further amplifies the compounding effects of increased economic success. One approach to see the contemporary Chinese miracle, for instance, is to consider how historically competent administrative and management skills provided a foundation of well-crafted physical and social infrastructure. This was not a coincidence; rather, it was carefully considered in the dialectical vision for balanced growth and economic development that Mao Tse-Tung [17] presented in 1951. Agriculture and related light industries needed to grow at the same time as heavy industry, which was to be its core. Markets and raw materials would be supplied by agriculture, allowing for the capital accumulation necessary for heavy industries. The industry would then provide the resources required to support agriculture going forward, including heavy machinery and transportation gear, fertilizer, water-saving devices, electricity, gasoline, and construction materials for infrastructure.

Mao's advice to adapt to local circumstances is again highly compatible with a management choice to catch up, which resulted in the implementation of distinctively Chinese incentives to spark prosperity [18]. Although the communist party remains a powerful force, it is clear from visiting any plant or watching the efficiency and cleanliness of the subway systems in Beijing or Shanghai that organizational and administrative skills are broadly distributed.

Last but not least, to maintain prosperity and catch up, society and the economy must incorporate an endogenous technical capability to continue climbing the technological ladder. But as shown by the experiences of Taiwan (Province of China), Korea, and Japan, this is not automatic; rather, it is planned for via a comprehensive technology and training program. It

is also clearly clear that the Chinese are investing in developing an internal technical capability, including by bringing back people from outside, by using their newly discovered resources as well as their administrative and management prowess.

However, China has serious challenges/obstacles. As previously above, the socialist investment in infrastructure and people—the ultimate source of national wealth—created the framework for China to unleash its creative potential and use the market to its advantage. The creator of market reforms, Deng Xiaoping, is quoted as saying, "To get rich is glorious." The state has continued to invest in human capital despite the release of personal incentives; as a country with medium human development, its human development index grew from 0.556 in 1985 to 772 in 2007.

The Chinese Communist Party also realized that industrialization was causing severe environmental damage and human suffering; maybe in reaction to this enormous challenge, it is now pushing to become a leader in renewable energy technologies like solar and wind power. The country had the highest drop among all those for which data was available, with its metric tons of CO₂ per thousand falling from 1.77 in 1990 to 0.95 in 2005 [World Bank 2010].

Therefore, we believe that investing in people is both a method and an aim in itself of achieving sustainable and equitable prosperity via the development of endogenous technical ability to diversify the economy. In addition to limiting consumption, this ability must be used to protect natural capital. Although China's centralized leadership may be better able to accomplish these goals, we strongly believe in democratic governance, so we would be reluctant to suggest centralized and autocratic governance as a means of achieving managerial and administrative capacity.

while one institution in Pakistan seems to have the management and administrative ability to provide the results mentioned above for China. In keeping with the customs of the British colonial force, the Pakistani military maintains a physical and nonverbal barrier from the populace. That could be required to instill and maintain the management and administrative skills that allow it to complete tasks quickly and effectively. Everyone who visits military sites and cantonments attests to the higher standard of upkeep. Resources are undoubtedly helpful, but they may also be wasted due to corruption or misuse.

However, the military is not the only institution with this kind of management and administrative aptitude and effectiveness. Better-run private sector businesses, academic institutions, and Pakistan's highway police all exhibit comparable performance [5]. Although it might be argued that this capability was allocated to Pakistan's version of a space race—the construction and maintenance of a nuclear program—we believe the nation would have benefited more if this unwavering focus had been placed on human development and an export push. While the educated public and popular lore generally acknowledge the military's obvious managerial and administrative superiority, the important questions for us are whether this capacity is real, whether it should be used for wider economic development, and whether, in Pakistan's case, the military stands in the way

of economic development. Let's examine a potential method for the superior administrative and management skills of the military to spread.

It may actively participate in economic activity and transfer prosperity to the private sector within a framework of competition. However, due to a lack of access to the data required for assessment, it is difficult to determine the activity's cost efficiency or profitability. It becomes much more plausible that the military is not competitive in the private sector when one considers the requirement for subsidies to support commercial military activities [19]. A report from the Parliament Public Accounts Committee was cited by The News International, a well-known English-language newspaper, on September 22, 2010, claiming that military-run corporations were receiving a subsidy of Rs. 200 billion.

Not all, but a large number of these initiatives are run and operated by former military members. It may be argued that they should contribute to success in these endeavors even after retirement by bringing their discipline with them. However, the complexity and requirements of private sector operations surpass those of military training, which may explain the high failure rate of military forays into the economy. Thus, there isn't much evidence to back the military's involvement in the commercial sector.

There have been no more effective military attempts to instill a sense of discipline and efficiency in civilian life. Former military personnel who work for civil society groups use some of their military skills in their job. Discipline, timeliness, and effectively carrying out orders are compromised by a lack of adaptability and innovation, however. A contradiction between an authoritarian and hierarchical attitude and democratic values is also present.

General Musharraf nominated serving generals to lead significant civil organizations, such as the Pakistan Cricket Board, exhibiting the normal haughty attitude held in the military that they are superior to civilians in all issues [6]. In 1999, the Water and Power Distribution Authority (WAPDA), a major utility in the nation, was placed under the leadership of a serving general. Under the following five years (until 2003), the average annual power and distribution losses rose to 25% of total production, up from 23% under the previous regimes (1988-1999) [20]. Heartburn abounded throughout the general's terrible term as Pakistan's cricket chief.

Pakistan's long-term success is therefore unlikely to be predicated on the type of managerial and administrative capacity that has been outlined for China, and it is also unlikely that the military will be able to disseminate such a capacity by militarizing civilian life whenever it seizes power and halts the political process. They have gotten more deeply ingrained in civilian life with every political takeover, and this is not in the country's best interests—rather, it is done to maintain an ever-expanding defense-economic empire that benefits military personnel and their families rather than the general populace [19].

Is Pakistan's Defense Economic Management More Effective?

As previously stated, the forces have administrative and managerial skills that are not transferable to the commercial

sector, public company administration, or civil society organization management. However, the military has a widely-held belief that it is much better capable of managing the economy. As the three previous intervening generals before him had claimed, General Musharraf cited the absence of civilian competence in this area as one of the grounds for taking over. Thankfully, there were no important economic jobs awarded to sitting generals, but it was thought the military administration would have the wisdom to choose qualified candidates to boost economic output.

A military government's economic performance cannot be easily measured and compared to that of a civilian administration. Because General Ayub Khan (1958–1969) was a highly hands-on economic manager, comparing his administration to others as mentioned in "Friends Not Masters" his political autobiography, presents a development vision akin to that of Korea's President Park Chung-hee (1961–1979). The GDP per capita of the two nations was comparable in the 1950s. In 1950 and 1960, Pakistan's per capita GDP as a proportion of the US was 9.8% and 7.8%, respectively, whereas Korea's was 7.6% (less than Pakistan's) and 11.8 %, respectively. In 1995, Pakistan's share remained unchanged at 8.3 percent; however, Korea's share rose to 42.4 percent [21].

Although both generals envisioned economic growth, the foundations they laid for it differed greatly. The Republic of Korea is recognized for having been successfully industrialized by General Park Chung-hee, who also laid the groundwork for the nation's economic advancement to high-income status and admission into the OECD's wealthy country club (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). A period of crony capitalism, which remains the blight of Pakistan's economy, was either unintentionally brought about by General Ayub Khan (political gain) or intentionally brought about by his incapacity and ineptitude. Thus, Pakistan was using tariffs and licenses to protect manufacturers from both internal and foreign competition, whereas the Korean economic team brutally demanded performance (quality exports) in return for short-term incentives [22]. Pakistan's top-ranking high-value export in 2010 was clothing [23], and industry requests for preferential treatment continue unabated [24].

Deger and Sen further assert that there is little economic "spin-off" from defense to development, citing a direct link between defense expenditure and economic growth [27]. However, Emile Benoit also pointed out certain drawbacks of military expenditure on economic development in LDCs, even if he ultimately concluded that the benefits of military investment exceed the drawbacks. He divided these detrimental effects into three categories. The first is income shift, which suggests that growing military spending lowers the GDP of the civilian sector. Second, the productivity effect: Compared to the private civilian sector, the public defense industry has a slower rate of gains in efficiency. The

third consequence is the investment effect, which is predicated on the claim that spending on the military "crowds out" the civilian sector[28].

While making a distinction between resource-rich and resource-constrained nations, Fredericksen and Looney state that while defense spending may be beneficial for industrially advanced states, it is more likely to divert funds from more fruitful domestic investments for developing states, which will hurt growth [29]. Extending the reasoning, Leontief and Duchin assert that almost any economy can raise overall production and per capita consumption while gradually cutting down on military spending[30]. David Lim, who conducted an empirical analysis and discovered that defense expenditure was harmful to economic development, shares similar views[31].

The military's "absorption of the scientists, engineers, designers and other skilled labor, thus depriving the dynamic civilian export-oriented industries" and the "diversion of capital in the form of land is also diverted away from the civilian sector" are the main negative effects of military spending on state economic growth that have been identified by various authors [32].

Concurrently, a considerable number of academics contend that there is no relationship between defense expenditure and economic expansion. "Military expenditures neither help nor hurt economic growth in the LDCs to any significant extent," according to Biswas and Ram [33].

Military Expenditure Trends in Pakistan

Since gaining independence, Pakistan has struggled to maintain both its strategic and economic viability due to external threats, internal unrest exacerbated by the state's weak and haphazard policies, and much-discussed foreign interventions. In the developing world, Pakistan and India are regarded as two of the "nine pivotal states" [34]. India is rapidly growing its armaments sector as part of its aspirations to become a worldwide activist, which puts Pakistan in dangerous security situations [35]. Pakistan has been spending a significant amount of money on both local and international weapon purchases. The developments in Pakistan's military budget over the last 20 years are seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates how military spending rose during the first half of the 1990s, rising from \$2722 million in 1988 to \$3666 million in 1995, or 34.68% more, even though Pakistan's economy was in a slump as a result of the government's poor performance and the numerous layers of economic and military sanctions placed on the country because it pursues a nuclear program[36]. By the middle of the 1990s, sanctions had been loosened thanks to Brown's amendment, which had improved Pakistan's economic circumstances. This was in line with Pakistan's reduction in defense expenditure, which in 2001 dropped to \$2842 million, or 22.48%, the level from 1990. Pakistan was able to maintain its conventional security during this time by consistently fortifying its military against various challenges.




Figure 1: Spending on the Military in Current US Dollars, 1988–2013 (Data sourced from the 2013 SIPRI Yearbook)

After 9/11, most of Pakistan's limitations were loosened, opening up new opportunities for the country's economy [37]. The Coalition Support Fund and other macroeconomic reforms in the 2000s helped Pakistan's economy recover [38]. Pakistan successfully privatized nationalized banks, broke up the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation's monopoly, introduced trade and tariff reforms, promoted higher education, established a top-notch anti-money laundering law, cracked down on intellectual property piracy, implemented agricultural and industrial reforms, and promptly settled investor disputes. These are just a few examples of the state-subsidized utilities that Pakistan privatized [39]. Although there were no notable short-term effects of this approach, Pakistan's economy did eventually

begin to recover. Figure 1 demonstrates that the country's military budget has likewise gradually increased, reaching \$7641 million in 2013—a rise of 168.86%. The amount spent on the military stagnated between 2007 and 2009. At the time, Pakistan's internal politics were in disarray due to the government's conflict with the court, and Pakistan was accused of playing a "double game" in Afghanistan by the United States [40].

Pakistan had particular hardships in the 1990s due to the cessation of foreign help and the nation's near-bankruptcy caused by an unstable internal political climate. When Pakistan carried out its nuclear tests in retaliation for nuclear explosions in India, the situation became much worse [41].




Figure 2: GDP Share of Defense Expenditure from 1988 to 2013 (Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2013)

It seems that Pakistan reduced its defense expenditures to lessen the economic losses after reaching the threshold of the nuclear program and creating credible nuclear deterrence. Pakistan's military expenditure during the last 20 years is shown as a proportion of GDP in Figure 2. As a proportion of GDP, it shows that military expenditure fell from 6.4% in 1988 to 3.8% in 2000.

Pakistan effectively fulfilled all of the performance standards that were established with the IMF between 2000 and 2006 [42], and its GDP grew from 2% in 2001 to 7.7% in 2005. Pakistan faced difficult political and economic circumstances. The government's ratio of expenditure on the military rose briefly to 27.4% in 2004 before declining once again to 17.2% in 2008. It almost stagnated from 2008 to 2013, reaching a current level of 16.2% in 2013.

at home as well as significant foreign pressure, particularly from international monetary institutions, during the difficult years of 2005 to 2008. As shown in Figure 2, military expenditure as a share of GDP decreased further, from 4% in 2001 to 2.8% in 2010, before rising once again to 3% in 2013.

One of the most significant developments in this context is seen in Figure 3. The data indicates a decline in defense expenditure as a proportion of total government spending from 2.9% in 1994 to 22.1% in 2000.




Figure 3: Government spending on the military as a percentage of total spending, 1993–2001 (SIPRI Yearbook, 2013)

Indirect Contributions of the Defense Sector in Pakistan's Economy

According to analysts, Pakistani security studies have been grounded on a historical-realistic framework [43]. This pragmatic approach, in conjunction with Pakistan's "insecurity syndrome"[44], which was heightened by the 1971 Pak-India war and Pakistan's disintegration, led to the forces being strengthened and, consequently, Pakistan's security within the anarchic international system. The defense is the only sector in Pakistan that has employed the greatest number of people, therefore the indirect effects of its expenditures are still substantial. [44]. Improved roads, communication lines, bridges, and airports benefit the civilian sector as well as the social sector, which includes hospitals, schools, colleges, and universities. Because of the significant funding allocation, military-run institutions seem to be more effective throughout the nation. The sections of the nation that are most remote—tribal, northern, and portions of Balochistan, for example—are often the ones that gain the most from the military's developmental efforts [45]. Armed forces members get many essential trainings (medical, technical, etc.) in addition to their military training. They are also encouraged to seek higher education by the military, both for themselves and for their offspring. Following their retirement from the military, they return to remote regions of the nation and work to modernize their communities there. Since 63% of people in Pakistan live in villages [46], retired army members who return to their hometowns often start schools, local technical training centers, medical clinics, or

other similar establishments to support the socioeconomic advancement of the rural community.

The forces play a significant role more likely to act as unifying or integrating the national fabric in diverse societies, like Pakistani society, which is riven by ethnic divisions. Pakistan's military-affiliated organizations, such as the Army Welfare Trust, the Shaheen Foundation, the Fauji Foundation, and the Bahria Foundation, employ civilians in addition to retired military personnel and carry out social uplift initiatives like building schools and health facilities, among other things, supporting Pakistan's economic growth. They have made investments in the building, electronics, and electrical sectors, as well as the cement and fertilizer industries. By making Pakistan self-sufficient and conserving foreign cash, these sectors are satisfying the demands of the civilian economy and lowering the country's reliance on imports. In her book *Military Inc.*, Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua criticized the military's influence on Pakistan's commerce and economy, particularly concerning organizations created for retired military people [47]. Both favorable and negative criticism has been directed towards the MILBUS idea. It should be welcomed and encouraged. However, institutionalizing the military's position in the civilian sector is also necessary to prevent monopolistic tendencies and promote healthy competition.

Pakistan's Defense Sector: A Direct Factor in Economic Development

Pakistan is unlikely to cut down on its military spending anytime soon, given the geopolitical landscape of Southern

Asia. Consequently, it would appear reasonable to make better use of Pakistan's current defense spending for the state's economic development. It is possible to take action to make the defense-related sector as a whole or, as a first step, the defense-oriented industry self-sufficient, meaning that it can produce enough income to support itself. Trillions of dollars are produced annually by the defense-aligned industry worldwide. Since Pakistan gained its independence, there have been proposals to indigenize the defense sector. The country must establish the ability to conduct research and create weaponry that is fairly adequate to meet the demands of the armed forces. This will include indigenous defense manufacturing and R&D. Saving foreign currency, maintaining technological independence, making money via sales, and providing significant advantages to the civilian sector are the justifications for such an approach [48].

Pakistan has had difficulties in preserving its natural resources, economy, and strategic assets. There were sixteen active ordnance manufacturers in India at the time of independence, but none existed in Pakistan. Pakistan thus lacked the equipment required to begin constructing its ordnance plant at the time of its independence. In January 1948, it was refused its part of the ordnance factories and instead received a pitiful six crore rupees, hardly enough to cover the cost of even one plant [49]. Pakistan has to decide whether to acquire the required defense supplies from elsewhere or grow its military sector domestically to meet the challenge. It concurrently adopted the two policies [50]. In the 1950s, Pakistan likewise inked defense pacts with the United States to guarantee the provision of cutting-edge weapons to its armed forces [51]. Up until the Indo-Pak War in 1965, when sanctions were placed on both India and Pakistan, the flow of weaponry persisted. Pakistan was in a difficult situation since it needed to rely on the West to provide it with weapons, whereas India had taken a multilateral stance and was also receiving weapons from the Soviet Union. Pakistan's anxieties were validated by the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, which also marked the beginning of a policy of comparatively increased self-reliance. It created the Defence Production Division in 1972 with the goals of establishing policies, creating plans, coordinating research and procurement efforts, and quickening technical advancement to increase self-reliance via indigenization [52].

In September 1971, the Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) was founded to produce, repair, modernize, and develop armored personnel carriers, tanks, and tank guns [53]. Pakistan built the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex near Kamra, north of Islamabad, in the next years. These factories create the Mushshak and K-8 Karakoram training aircraft, repair and build radar and avionics equipment, assemble and restore Chinese F-6s and French Mirages, and most recently construct JF-17 in partnership with China [54]. In addition to updating POF Wah, it established a Heavy Forge Foundry in 1978 and a Heavy Rebuild Factory in 1979.

To support exports related to the defense sector and to assist international queries about defense items affiliated with the Land, Naval, and Air Forces as well as other Security Agencies, Pakistan founded the Defense Export Promotion Organization (DEPO) in 2001[55]. It has been effectively

promoting Pakistani defense items outside since 2001. To fortify its defense production capabilities, it reorganized the Defense Production Division into the Ministry of Defence Production in 2004. This ministry was in charge of organizing and promoting the acquisition and manufacturing of defense-related equipment as well as the export of excess goods to friendly and neighboring nations [56]. The International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS), which is held every two years, was established in 2000 as part of the upgrading of the infrastructure used for the indigenous military build-up. Over time, the IDEAS gained a lot of popularity. For example, in 2000 there were 285 representatives from 42 nations and 65 exhibitors from 15 countries; in contrast, 256 exhibitors and 88 foreign delegations from 50 countries attended the IDEAS 2014 [57]. It has been a great success and has helped to advance Pakistan's defense exports, particularly to emerging and less developed nations in Asia and Africa.

In 2009, Pakistan's defense sector supplied equipment valued at \$6.3 billion, and by 2015, it was predicted to reach \$10.4 billion [58]. The majority of the products are made to meet the military forces' domestic requirements. Pakistan has been pursuing a strategy to achieve self-reliance in its defense manufacturing by learning from the past. It has been implementing a program since 2002 to increase the defense manufacturing facilities' current capacity to increase defense exports [59]. Consequently, the nation's defense exports increased by 650%, from \$100 million in 2006 and \$40 million in 2000 to over \$300 million in 2012 [60]. With an ever-growing galaxy of happy clients, Pakistan's defense goods are used in over 30 nations [61]. The destinations include the Central Asian States, North America, Africa and the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Far East, and North America [62]. In addition to a few lesser agreements for heavy goods, Pakistan has been supplying small guns and ammunition to these nations. Major agreements for the acquisition of tanks Al-Khalid and Al-Zarrar, aircraft K-8 trainers, JF-17 Thunder [63], armored cars, and domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicles are anticipated. The state sector has remained primarily responsible for Pakistan's defense industry. However, with the 1990s technology revolution and the 2000s cautious policies, some private businesses have entered the market [64]. The Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) have been given the green light by the government to work more closely with the private sector to produce more weapons and ammunition for export in 2006 [65]. POF and other governmental defense firms have started some cooperative ventures with other local and foreign commercial businesses.

Better access to cutting-edge technologies and the global electronic infrastructure is necessary for information age battles [66]. Pakistan is falling behind in the field of research and development (R&D) notwithstanding these advancements. Its access to contemporary defense-related technology has been reliant on outside sources. Pakistan has made significant infrastructure modifications to its higher education system since 2000, which has enhanced productivity in the research sector[67] and raised the total number of PhDs to 8142 in 2012[68]. Despite its intellectual output, Pakistan continues to fall behind in terms of

university-industry links. Effective management of this domain might provide significant benefits for Pakistan's industrial production, including both civilian and military sectors. Pakistan has been producing sophisticated weaponry and ammo. There is a huge distinction between "smart arms" and "traditional arms": the former refer to arms that are equipped with the newest technical instruments. The industry buzzwords for smart weaponry include the most sophisticated GPS systems, laser-guided technologies, and other similar systems. Pakistan is attempting to reap the most advantages from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), but its progress may be quickened by strengthening its R&D sector's capabilities and making efficient use of its current capacity[69].

Other elements of the domestic military industry's contribution to state economic development include the

possibility that intellectual capital, which is a significant source of concern when it escapes to other lands, would end up "captive" inside the nation [70]. Pakistan's unemployment problem may be resolved by accelerating industrialization. Figure 4 depicts the results of a 2011 Gallup Survey that revealed 19% of Pakistani citizens wanted to live overseas permanently. This proportion was 6% in June 2008 [71]. According to reports in 2013, 2.7 million Pakistanis have left the nation in the previous five years [72]. The military sector is recognized for offering attractive compensation packages, stable employment, and the opportunity to work with cutting-edge equipment for research and development. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that it not only stops the brain drain but also reverses it, drawing Pakistanis who are residing overseas to work for the government.




Figure 4: Pakistanis Who Would Move Permanently Abroad (Source: Gallup 2011)

Second, particularly when those weapons are most required, foreign countries have used Pakistan's imports as leverage to force Pakistan to comply with their demands. For a substantial portion of its history, Pakistan has been subject to Western sanctions. These sanctions—particularly the ones from the 1990s—turned out to be a godsend, as Pakistan steadfastly pursued an independent strategy that lessened its reliance on foreign weapons.

Third, a robust defense industrial base also contributes to national prestige. Because the international system is anarchic, a nation must be both economically and militarily powerful, and pursuing a robust defense sector advances both goals. David Isenberg noted that Pakistan is attempting to "strengthen its industrial base and bolster its standing as a regional power" via defense exports [73].

Fourth, Pakistan is enhancing its reputation as a fresh and accountable participant in the established game by forming joint ventures with different nations in the defense industrial sector.

We examined the hypothesis that military regimes improve economic performance using data from 1961 to 2009, as, as previously said, low economic performance has been one of the primary defenses offered by all military regimes for military intervention[74]. We discovered that neither superior

economic development nor bad economic performance leads to military involvement under military governments [75].

Theoretically, Olson (1993) presents an economic argument in favor of democracy versus authoritarianism. Mixed empirical results have been found about the relationship between democracy and development, mostly via the use of cross-country growth regressions [76]. For eighteen Latin American nations, Bowman [77] shows a negative correlation between militarism and democracy, economic development, and equality.

While Khilji and Akhtar [77] do not use co-integration, they provide slender evidence in favor of a negative correlation between Pakistan's economic development to authoritarianism. We estimated a standard growth equation using an implicit production function and time series analysis, with GDP growth being explained by capital formation, labor, and regime [79], despite our reservations about growth regression from a theoretical and measurement standpoint. According to our estimations, a military government would explain 1.9 percent of the observed rise. The overall capacity of the equation to explain growth, particularly for a time series regression, is quite weak (an R bar square of 13 percent), so even if the result is statistically significant, we have little trust in it.

Using data from the Government of Pakistan (2010) and the World Bank's World Development Indicators (online), we also compare the economic, social, and human condition variables under the General Musharraf administration to those of the political administrations that preceded it (those of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif following the dictatorship of General Zia ul Haque). The comparison is suggestive since many other factors might account for economic success outside the skill of the military or civilian economic administration. Furthermore, the effects of previous administrations' actions may persist in the next one for a little while. This issue may be partially resolved by averaging across many years in each scenario—ten for the democratic administrations and eight for the military regimes. In the end, if the performance does not significantly vary, it would challenge the military administrations' presumption of clear superiority.

Although we choose not to provide tables to save space, the research indicates that this assumption should be questioned since the comparison performance yields inconsistent findings [80]. The most striking discovery in analyzing the military administration's financial and monetary policies in comparison to the political administrations that came before it is that, during the military era, military allocations as a percentage of GDP were nearly twice as high as they were under civilian administrations [81]. It seems that the military is compelled to be more frugal when it is in direct command. It may apply pressure behind the scenes under governments that are ostensibly civilian. Using World Bank data for 31 nations, Looney (1989) provides evidence that suggests this seems to be more generally the case when comparing military to civilian administrations. Even if there may have been real cutbacks in other places, it seems like Pakistan is just seeing smoke and mirrors when it comes to the cuts.

Frequently, military budgets are concealed under the leadership of another ministry. Additionally, General Musharraf's government eliminated military pensions from the military budget in 2001, according to a September 22, 2010 article in *The News International*. According to the Parliament Public Accounts Committee, they then soared from Rs. 26 billion in 2001 to Rs. 76 billion in 2010 for the three million military retirees. In comparison to civilian retirees, military retirees received an average of Rs. 24,000 as opposed to Rs. 3,600. In comparison to budget 2009–2010, Pakistan's military spending in the 2010–2011 budget, which was implemented under a civilian government, increased by 16.5%. The Public Development Sector Program additionally provides an allocation for military projects to the Defense Division in addition to this direct allocation [82]. The military government's far-reduced tax effort raises concerns about their better economic management, which is the second unexpected outcome.

In addition, the military administration submitted to IMF discipline, and its economic management staff felt quite at ease with this economic philosophy [83]. Better budgetary discipline (a smaller fiscal deficit) is the result of this, but the cost is paid in lower development investment as a proportion of GDP, which is shown in lower infrastructure development. Indicators of other macroeconomic factors also point to improved economic performance under military rule, with

savings, capital creation, and public and private investment as a share of GDP much greater under military rule than under civilian administrations.

The capital formation and private investment superior input indicators did not efficiently convert into outcome variables. The military administration's GDP growth rate was only slightly faster than that of the civilian regimes. Furthermore, there was a fall in exports as a proportion of GDP, which is a measure of the competitive quality of production. The greatest mistake, however, was not investing in the creation of useful physical infrastructure to support the economy's long-term development. For instance, the installed capacity growth percentage for telephones, roads, and electricity all decreased by a factor of ten. The electrical shortfall in the last years of the Musharraf government may have been caused by a drop in installed capacity growth from 110.8 percent to 10.5 percent. Since 2010, excessive load shedding has become a national epidemic, and it is probably here to stay.

The military government's unwillingness to make investments to better the social and human conditions of the populace, however, is a more significant shortcoming. Democratic governments risk losing elections if they disregard such delivery as they are accountable to the larger public. When it came to the military administration's commitment to spending on these important social areas as a proportion of GDP, spending on health and education was lower. With schools and hospitals being more congested, the crude result indicators also demonstrate a weaker performance by the military in the majority of situations. The comparable performance when considering the human situation was far poorer.

The actual daily salary of skilled workers fell as unemployment rose. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the military government performed far worse on many disparity and poverty measures. Much less progress was made in lowering poverty and the poverty gap, and there was no improvement in lowering the Gini coefficient [84].

Real salaries were conditioned by inflation, which was generally lower during the military rule period but sharply increased in the last year of the Musharraf administration. Indicators of life expectancy and baby and child mortality rates were improved during the military regime, but not for adult females. Overall, nonetheless, the presumption of the overwhelming dominance of the military's control over the economy and society's administration is questioned due to factors related to the human condition, society, and the economy. Indeed, despite this data, the military is likely to maintain its belief that it is unmatched in every way, and this might be related to military education and the development of a mindset inside the military that tends to ignore facts[85].

Furthermore, in terms of technological advancement and the creation of a skilled labor force for the nation, these sectors' Research and Development (R&D) divisions support the civil industrial sector. Effective management of nuclear reactors in Pakistan may facilitate economic growth by delivering electricity.

The injustice that welfare favors largely those connected to the military endures even if the military restructures its expenditures to follow more profitable paths. The transfer of resources to more widespread welfare can only succeed if the

civil administration provides value for the money. It's unclear whether the welfare system developed by the military is a response to the failing system or if it is impeding the creation of a universal one. If political administrations allocate resources more fairly and make better use of the resources at their disposal, army welfare may become outdated.

Reducing the monetary benefits given to senior officers and doing away with unnecessary communication in intra- and inter-service settings caused by immature C4Is are two ways to reduce resources. The government of General Musharraf made many notable moves to address this problem. Shireen Mazari believed in 2002 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee should lead to significant coordination between the three services in terms of doctrine and introduction of new weapons systems, even at the level of research and development where each service seems to be "doing it alone," but the reality is different.

It was a waste of resources in addition to time and space. Operations should be characterized by "real jointness," and inter-service competition that culminates in furious outbursts and turf battles should be eradicated. Especially in non-strategic sectors, private firms should be brought in to increase capacity and efficiency, develop a target-oriented strategy, and free up resources for the key avenues.

Pakistan's strategic location means that the country's military spending is probably going to rise soon. Because of this, it seems that Pakistan's present military budget is being used more wisely and effectively to promote economic expansion. There would be measures to achieve self-sufficiency for the defense or at least the military sector.

Investment in and employment in the defense industry, especially in developing economies, are seen as sources of rising demand. Each year, the global military business brings in billions of dollars in income. The world's least developed nations' military budgets may positively impact the development of their industrial sectors.

Governments get billions of dollars from the military sector via the sale of firearms and related gear. Even still, it seems that everyone is coming up with original guesses, so your guess is as good as mine. Even if it could be as practical as a chocolate teapot, positive ideas can always be dispersed.

CONCLUSION

The self-sufficiency of Pakistan's defense sector undoubtedly boosts its productivity and ability to provide funding for the armed forces overall. To achieve this goal, it seems that the parliament must pass legislation requiring Pakistan to consider the import of associated technology as well as equipment when creating purchase plans. It will enhance Pakistan's industries' technical foundation both numerically and qualitatively. One instance of this strategy is the Pakistani submarine industry, which is developing entirely indigenous technology.⁹³ The capacity of the armed forces to have the equipment they need to handle emergencies, even in the event that foreign supply are delayed, is the primary advantage of the domestic defense sector. Pakistan stands to gain by concentrating on the development of its Potential Defence Capacity (PDC),⁹⁴ which will serve to bolster the nation's defense while simultaneously promoting economic expansion.

The military's current budget must be used effectively. In addition to improving efficiency by reducing corruption, particularly in the military procurement process, excesses such as unnecessary imports of luxury automobiles or other luxury goods for top commanders should be minimized. Reducing the financial rewards to senior officers and preventing communication waste in inter- and intra-services setup due to underdeveloped C4Is are two ways to increase resources. The regime of General Musharraf took some admirable actions to solve this problem. In 2002, Shireen Mazari made the following observation: "The Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) exists to facilitate theoretical collaboration between the three services with regard to doctrine and the introduction of new military systems. But the truth is different; even in terms of research and development, every service seems to be "going it alone." It led to the waste of resources in addition to time and space. "True jointness" may be used to describe operations, and turf battles and inter-service rivalry that result in ultimate excesses should be avoided. In order to improve capacity and efficiency, adopt a goal-oriented approach, and free up resources for use in key avenues, private firms should be included, particularly in the non-strategic avenues.

These previously indicated resources may be used to industry conversions and the creation of auxiliary sectors in order to support the state's economic development. The policies ought to be oriented towards this direction. For example, POF Wah comprises approximately fourteen industries and three subsidiaries. Of these, some, such as Tungsten Alloy Factory, Tungsten Carbide Factory, Steel Foundry, Brass Mills, Garments Factory, Wah Nobel, and Wah Hi-Tech Plastics, have dual uses and can be fully or partially privatized without creating security risks. For example, if the Garments Factory is fully privatized, this won't jeopardize the security or the supply of the crucial commodity; on the contrary, it will increase its efficacy. Additionally, Pakistan has been advertising its defense hardware at various international defense shows and via IDEAS. Although it seems like a positive move, by enlisting the assistance of the private sector's specialized experts, its speed may be accelerated and aggressive marketing tactics can be undertaken.

Pakistan dedicates over 3% of its GDP to defense; thus, the remaining 97% might be used more effectively by cutting down on resource waste and improving accountability across the board.⁹⁸ The economy may also be boosted with the 3%, mostly via conversions.

In Pakistan, political administration corruption and economic ineptitude have been used as justifications for a series of military takeovers.

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