

## A REVIEW OF THE POST-9/11 DECADE LITERATURE ON PAKISTANI MADRASSAS (RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS)

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**ABSTRACT:** Literature published on Pakistani madrassas (religious schools) during the decade 2001-2011 (after the terrorist event of 9/11, 2001 in United States) is the focus of this paper. A huge volume of literature was published during that period, exposing multiple aspects of madrasa education system in Pakistan. Methodologies, quality of data, and findings of different studies and reports have been discussed and questions are raised in this paper. Major themes found in the literature were: perceptions regarding Islamic radicalization in madrasa, role of transnational powers in making madrasa's role controversial, role of Pakistani governments, supporting factors for madrasa's strength, role of poverty in madrasa enrolment, division in education system of Pakistan, mainstream educational system giving space to madrasa system, madrasa education and market economy, perceptions inside madrassas, negating madrasa-militancy correlation and utility of madrasa. The study concluded that World opinion on Pakistani madrasa, during the era under study, was divided into three main categories: a) madrassas play negative role in society, these can not be reformed, and therefore, must be closed down; b) madrassas can be made beneficial for state and society if reformed by insertion of modern knowledge into their curricula; c) madrassas are just providing shelter for the poor, let them carry on their business, and do not care of them. It has also been noticed that there had been the lack of scientific approach in publishing the aforesaid which, as a result, not only created journalistic sensations but also blurred the real face of this institution.

**KEY WORD:** Islamic radicalization, Pakistani madrassas, Poverty, Religious militancy, Jihad, Education system

**INTRODUCTION:** Review of relevant literature has been always an essential part of the scientific inquiries in the fields of social as well as natural sciences. It facilitates to comprehend a phenomenon in the light of other scholars' work. This scientific tradition has been followed in this article. After the terrorist attacks of 9<sup>th</sup> September 2001 in United States, the religious seminaries/schools in Pakistan, popularly known as madrassas or *deeni madaris*, came under limelight, and a huge literature was published against, and in favour of, this institution. The decade that followed 9/11 event was particularly important in this regard. A massive literature asserted connections of Pakistani madrasa with transnational Islamic militants who allery committed this terrorist event that caused a great financial and human loss for United States. Whereas the material published in the favour of madrasa tried to project it as peaceful set-up of the society. Nonetheless, the literature exposed multiple aspects of madrasa education system of Pakistan.

In this regard, maximum available literature like books, reports, papers and research articles on madrasa were taken under review. Notably, the relevant bookish material was found minimal as compared to the bulk of articles published in different journals, and the reports putout by of various institutions. A huge stock of the journalistic articles was also available in the periodicals and the news papers. Since all this reviewed material is not viable to document here: therefore, keeping in view the conceptual scope of this paper, only the selected material has been discussed.

International Crisis Group (ICG), head office in Brussels and sub-offices in sixty countries, conducts researches in different parts of the world on critical issues of international importance. This publishes its reports on quarterly basis. In this regard, ICG has published several reports on Pakistani madrassas. All these reports have established a significant relationship between Pakistani madrassas and the religious violence in the world.

For example, in the ICG report of 2007 on Karachi's madrassas, it has been asserted that madrassas do not impart

education, but extremism and sectarian indoctrination through religious sophistry [1]. The report has also documented an interview of a madrasa-teacher, in this regard. The teacher was asked a question about the importance of secular knowledge for Muslims. He replied, "it is most urgent for Muslims to learn English and other skills to encounter opponents' ideologies and aggressive plans".

The report argued that capacity of madrasa graduates to operate modern scientific equipment would make them even more dangerous. Therefore, the efforts to bring madrasa education into mainstream by including modern subjects would not serve the purpose of eliminating militancy from madrasa, the report said.

This study has also explored asserts that formal education system in Pakistan has eventually failed to address educational need of the masses. In this system, marginalized class of society doesn't find space for him. This failure of mainstream system, actually, serves as a major contributory factor for admissions of poor children in madrasa system.

ICG report of 2004 has mentioned that military rulers in Pakistan have been seeking support from religious establishment against the mainstream political parties [2]. For example, in General Musharruf's set-up in 2000s, *Jamiat Ulema-e- Islam (JUI)* was the major ally of the government in Baluchistan. Since *JUI* had followed *deobandi* tradition, and the largest madrasa-network in Pakistan was also belonged to *deobandi school of thought*: therefore, the Musharruf administration could not take any serious actions against madrassas at large scale.

ICG report recommended that all 'sectarian madrassas' in Pakistan must be closed down immediately. However, ICG did not make it clear how to differentiate sectarian ones from the rest others. Since each madrasa in Pakistan follows a specific school of thought or sect: therefore, all madrassas can be called as sectarian entities. And, if all madrassas are closed down immediately, where the two million students would go? ICG report ignored this aspect of the discourse.

This report of ICG has also suggested demolishing all the mosques and madrassas which are established on state-land. This also seems not viable in Pakistani socio-cultural framework. People are religiously sensitive and charged on the issues related to their belief system. Clergy can use religious sentiments of people against any such attempt of the government: because the destruction of mosques is prohibited in Islam.

Coulson though, did not advocate the demolition of mosques and madrassas in the country, yet he supported the view that modern secular subjects would not reform the attitude of madrasa students; and an ideology of intolerance and violent jihad would persist continually [3]. In the support of his argument, he referred the response of a madrasa student against the question “would you like to learn mathematics?” He replied, “Allah multiplies the reward of jihad many times: and mathematics would facilitate me to calculate this reward of Jihad that I would get in hereafter”.

The author mentioned that America, in 1980s, financed Pakistani madrassas to promote *jihadi* education in order to achieve the goal of containing Soviet expansionism. But the strategic gains were negligibly as compared to the long term trouble. And now, the US government is again funding many Muslim states, including Pakistan, to rein their unbridled Islamists. He revealed that thousands of madrassas in the world are inculcating an ideology of intolerance, violence and hate: which is posing threat to the national security of United States.

The researcher claimed that the former President of Pakistan General Pervaiz Musharraf, who was so called front man against terrorism, was not sincere to eliminate Islamic militancy from the country. Rather, he was using Islamism and madrasa as a posing threat to the West. By this mean, he tried to justify his continued military dictatorship, and avoided the western pressure for restoration of real democracy in Pakistan.

The scholar also highlighted that US trade policy was not liberal, that negatively effected the economic and educational growth in developing countries. This ultimately led to poverty, resentment and militancy. He suggested that US should review its trade policy, and support economy of underdeveloped countries as a long term measure to curb militancy.

Doumato observed that religious education in the Muslim world has been sourced in the Islamic Scripture [4]. He asserted that the concepts like jihad, martyrdom, apostate killing, domination over non-Muslims, distrust on Jews and Christians, and condemnation of music, co-gatherings, nationalism, socialism, secularism or existentialism: all are, actually, commandments of the Scripture. He concluded that Islamic Scripture itself provides a fertile ground for a distinct behaviour of Muslims, which is the root-cause of hatred and militancy among the Muslim youth.

Doumato asserted that Islamic religious education cannot be compatible with the process of modernization, and it could never be brought to the ideals of the Western world. In this regard, he presented the example of Saudi Arabia. He highlighted that Saudi-Arabia, thus far, could not be able to produce its own technical workforce or skilled labour just because of teaching merely religion in schools.

Alexiev found a connection between teaching just religion in schools and the militant ideology in youth [5]. He also has quoted example of Saudi Arabia. He asserted that Saudi Arabia had exported Islamic militancy to the rest Islamic world. He mentioned that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab of Saudi Arabia (mid-18<sup>th</sup> century AD) was the founding father of institutionalized extremism in Islam\_ the *Wahabism*. *Wahabi* thoughts first spread in Saudi Arabia: and then, with Saudi funding, to the other parts of the Muslim world. Saudi financing to Islamic extremism played a crucial role in its expansion to a global phenomenon. The researcher also highlighted that the key factors behind Islamic extremism have not been analyzed comprehensive as yet.

Alexiev predicted that the war on terror cannot be won easily: and it is highly premature to say ‘we are close to winning the war’. He claimed that until *Wahabism* will exist in the world, terrorism cannot be eradicated. This assertion of scholar can also lead to the assumption that *Wahabi* madrassas in Pakistan might have some involvement in the activities like violent extremism.

Looney’s work on madrasa explored an interesting novelty. He found that religious education system produces abnormal personalities [6]. In this regard, he presented a picture of madrasa graduates as, “practice fundamentalist creed marked by obscurantism, hatred of western civilization and Jews, misogyny and violent, functionally illiterate with virtually no job skill, but thoroughly prepared for a career in extremism and Jihad”.

Looney asserts that Islamic militancy across the globe is rooted in Pakistani madrassas. He explained its mechanism as “a certain number of students come to Pakistan from abroad; after graduating from madrasa, they return to their native lands with a specific ideology; they proliferate this ideology in their homelands, which cause to produce more religious militants in the world”.

The researcher also connects Islamic militancy in 1980s’ US policy against Soviet occupation on Kabul. He claimed that US president Jimmy Carter paid four billion dollars to promote *jihadi* culture in Pakistan. This *jihadi* culture was planted mainly through madrassas. And “now, it is not easy to revert this culture of violence just by putting pressure on governments” he suggested.

This study also identified a relationship between poverty and madrasa system in Pakistan. It revealed that the state, because of its financial constraints, could not open public schools consonant with population of country. Therefore, private sector came forward to fill this gap and opened innumerable schools across the country. However, the poorer segment of population could not be accommodated because of unaffordable fees and other expenditures. Finally, madrasa seemed a good alternative to this class to access education.

The study also noted four major sources of extremism in Pakistan: one, extensive Saudi funding; two, anti-democratic agendas of autocrat rulers; three, anti-American emotions among masses; and four, organizational zeal of *Jamaat-e-Islami*. The scholar asserted that combination of all these factors has been reflected in the form of madrasa growth in the country.

Singer found the defective public education system in Pakistan as a real root-cause of madrassa flourishing in the country [7]. He mentioned two types of school in Pakistan: one, the government schools, where the government officers themselves do not send their children because of low quality education and loose discipline; and two, private entrepreneur that is out of reach of lower middle class. Therefore, as a last resort, people send their children to madrassa: where free education is possible, even along with free food, free clothing and free accommodation.

Then, the researcher ascertained the mechanics of madrassa militancy. He revealed that graduates from these madrassas are non-skilled people who can do nothing to earn their living in general market. They can just lead congregational prayers in mosques, or can become religious teachers. Their own (religious) market is too limited as compared to their supply. Thus, the state of unemployment leads them to serve the evil designed interests of radical Islamists groups: and create disturbance in the world in the name of *jihad*.

The study concluded that the global culture of religious-violence or terrorism is linked with madrassa-boom in Pakistan. Madrassa sustains the supply-line for terrorists groups by providing them new recruits. The researcher suggests that this supply-line needs to be break-down to win the 'war on terror'. And it is just possible by erasing madrassa system from Pakistan. The source behind the culture of violence would stop only by undermining the institution that sustains it.

Fandy has shown the importance of madrassa institution in Muslim societies. He asserted that the story of Muslim world, in fact, is the story of Muslim education [8]. "How the secular ideology was displaced by radical militant ideas: to understand this mechanism one must study the role of madrassa in Muslim society" he suggested. He mentioned that teachers in madrassa system play more important role than books to shape-up the students' personalities.

The study pointed out that Islamic ideas travelled, in the past, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia to rest of the Muslim world. However, now the route is different. Now, Islam radiates from Pakistan to other Muslim countries. Therefore, flourishing of Islamic militancy across the globe is connected with Islamic education system in Pakistan. The scholar observed that the concept of *Umma* (global Muslim brotherhood) is beyond the reality of current State system: and is root-cause behind the production of global *jihadies*.

Newsweek published a mechanism how human software (mind) is made militant in religious seminaries [9]. It referred an interview of a nine years old student of *Jamia Uloom-e-Islamia*, a madrassa in hilly area of Pakistan. The student opined, "Taliban regime in Afghanistan was an Islamic model of State; US invasion distorted Muslim morality, and now Muslim girls have infidel boyfriends, and are clinking glasses of alcohol with Jews; the Jew are busy in efforts to poison Muslim minds with films, music and television; Americans are killing Muslims in the world, like in Afghanistan and Iraq".

The paper argued that the process of specific socialization prepares innocent minds to choose their career in violent *jihad*. Taliban leaders also passed through the same process. They got their start from Pakistani madrassas. Although CIA

supported *jihad* in 1980s against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, yet *jihad* academies (madrassas) continued their functioning even after the war, and carried on producing holy warriors. These holy warriors are now in front of American forces in Afghanistan.

The paper also criticized the role of former President Musharraf that "he talked a lot but did nothing". For example, he promised to control madrassas: instead, he formed a political alliance with the radical Islamists\_ the supporters of madrassa, against the mainstreamed secular parties. The paper referred former Afghan President Karzai that "Pakistan isn't doing enough to stop Taliban; and we cannot stop terrorism as long as Pakistan doesn't co-operate". Thus, Pakistani government had been deceiving the world about their determination against radical Islamic groups and their base-camps madrassas: nothing actually had done in this regard, the paper analyzed.

Ali documented a comparative study of madrassas in two cities of Pakistan, Islamabad and Ahmadpur. He conducted his research in 2009 and observed that madrassas were extensively expanding during that decade and enrolment pressure was so high, that children were found sleeping in corridors also [10]. Majority students in Islamabad belonged to Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa. The researcher referred a madrassa-manager that boost in enrolment was a post 9/11 phenomena, and a reaction to anti-Islam policies of the West. The study also revealed that majority madrassas were unlawfully constructed on public land. For example in Islamabad, 100 out of 103 madrassas were located on state land. The larger ones were situated on green belts of main avenues, reserved or protected areas. The researcher argued that establishing of a madrassa is actually preceded by a mosque; and mosque is protected by culture; therefore, illegally constructed madrassa on public land could never be demolished.

Kazmi and Pervez, focusing on socio economic and cultural conditions, elaborated the mechanism how innocent madrassa students and teachers were exploited and transformed into militants and fatal warriors: and thus the whole world developed hate and anger towards them [11]. The scholars perceived it a warfare strategy in Afghanistan during 1980s, and economically deprived stratum of Muslim population proved lethal soldiers in this nonconventional proxy war. Recruitment and instrumental use of poor youth was quite easy, and was an emerging trend in asymmetrical war in last few decades.

The authors concluded that the determinants of radicalization were present in socio- economic and political culture of the region. The prevailing socio-economic and political system failed to give positive direction to the energies of the youth, especially from poor and deprived classes. Consequently, their deep-rooted sense of suppressed deprivation, accumulated frustration and anger lead them towards radical ideologies and terrorism.

The study suggested reforms in overall educational and economic system of Pakistan. Spending just 2% of GDP on education is insufficient; and if government doesn't fulfil its responsibility, the social scientists, nationalist, economic and political thinkers ought to come forward to play their

organized role in the form of a social movement, the study recommended.

Rana conducted a study on the political attitude of Pakistani madrassa. He measured political attitude through the perceptions of madrassa-teachers on terrorism, war on terror, Pakistan's participation in war on terror, international relations, and the problems of Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Palestine [12]. He gathered his data from Islamabad, Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to the findings of this study, all madrassa-teachers were disagreed with the current use of the concept 'terrorism'. They argued that terrorism was an evil, and always condemnable: but this concept has been used as global campaign against Muslims to undermine Islam. The respondents opined that 'war on terror' is conspiracy and Pakistan should not participate in it. They also showed their moral support for Afghan Taliban, as they were fighting against foreign occupants. But, this moral support was not extended to Taliban-ideology: it was just restricted to their freedom struggle.

Two interesting facts were also revealed in this study. One, madrassa teachers perceive their profession as the best and superior to all worldly pursuits. They consider themselves the custodians of religion, and superior to rest of the population. Two, they perceive madrassa institution in a siege of conspiracies, and the Westerns (Jews and Christians) along with their agents in Pakistan busy in destabilizing madrassa to subvert Islam.

Rehman, cited in Malik, found in his study that Muslims' resentment towards the West was actually a "reaction to Western injustice, violence, and a history of exploitation and domination over Muslims". Madrassa being a part of larger Muslim community has no exemption to have such frustration: and if madrassa students and teacher are found resentful toward American policies, it is not surprising, according to the author.

Imtiaz conducted interviews of some officials of madrassa federations, and highlighted three main points. First, madrassa representatives feel it injustice to blame them as spreading extremism. Rather they consider the role of United States as controversial in many Muslim states: that cause antagonism and extremism. Secondly, madrassa representatives do not acknowledge poverty as chief factor behind madrassa enrolments. Rather, they claim religiosity as real instigative force for madrassa admissions. And finally, madrassa representatives perceive that government's action against madrassas is a way of showing its commitment to justify foreign aids. They understand that Pakistani rulers receive money by posing an artificial threat of madrassa to the rich Westerns. [14].

The author concluded that the present form of madrassa is different to that of in the past. She argued that the madrassas in the past were much more open than today: because they followed a true spirit of discourse and inquiry, and did not have militants hanging around them. She observed that madrassa today spreads a certain kind of ideology among students; and through students, to their families; and through families, to rest of the society. She asserted that nobody will

be able to enforce reforms on madrassas, because religion has gotten out of the control of those who want to inflict reforms. Brookings has documented a report on Pakistani madrassas. This report asserts that, although, various previous researches could not find any empirical evidence to connect madrassa with militancy, and a large number of researches declared madrassa-militancy correlation just a myth: however, most of the attacks on NATO supply lines in Pakistan have been made by such militants who associate themselves with madrassas by taking the title Taliban [15]. It argues that although whole Frontier region of Pakistan can be dangerous for Western interests, but madrassa specifically is a part of this conflict equation. Therefore, scholars need to re-think and re-view their previous understanding: and should not give a clean chit to madrassa.

Contrary to the extreme views of scholars discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a significant part of literature has also shown moderate vision. Some authors believed in utility of madrassa with some improvements in the system. They understand that madrassa institution has latent potential to serve the state and society, if it is used skilfully.

Bull has argued that madrassa education can be appropriated and harmonized with modernity, because Islam does not oppose the process of modernization (in contrast to the views of Doumato) [16]. Bull has presented the example of Indonesia where religious education supported the process of modernity as well as defended their value system successfully. In Indonesia, madrassa establishment created such an educational system in Java that addressed the need of a modern society as well as guarded against the perceived moral decay that comes with modernization and globalization. The aim of this educational system is to produce future leadership with solid religious background for variety of secular fields.

The author observed that Indonesian society has modern as well as religious trends simultaneously. Mostly, the parents wish for their children necessary knowledge and skill to do well in modern job market: and also the moral and religious training to become a good Muslims and upstanding citizens. Both these two demand of parents are virtuously fulfilled by the madrassa. The curriculum of these madrassas is dynamic, that has enabled them to negotiate modernization and globalization without the loss of their traditional values. Therefore, their graduates are capable to compete in international market of knowledge, as well as they are well-versed with Islamic Scripture.

The researcher argued that Indonesian position of balancing traditional religiosity and secular knowledge through madrassa education, offers an alternative model of Islamic modernity to the whole Muslim world. This model may especially be beneficial for the countries like Pakistan where madrassa is under intense criticism because of playing a steroid role in society.

Rehman in his studies on madrassa and society has given utmost importance to 'languages'. He argued in his study of 2005 that the type of 'language' one uses in his daily life, actually determines his social class [17]. Like, in Pakistan, English is frequently used by upper social class, whereas marginalized social class mostly use local languages. He asserted that the roles and status of individuals or groups in

society are associated with the extent to which they use English language. He observed that madrassa students and teachers, generally, belong to lower socio-economic stratum of society, because their exposure to 'English' is minimal.

Rehman's research of 2004 identified that Pakistan's educational system is divided into three categories: English medium schools; Urdu medium schools; and Islamic schools (madrassas). He noted that English medium schools served the upper, upper-middle, and middle classes; the Urdu medium schools are aimed at lower middle and working classes; and, madrassas provide education for poorer, marginalized, or very religious class of society. [18].

The author argued that the curriculum and the medium of instructions of different educational systems mark socio-economic classes of their beneficiaries. This difference is also a source of variation in their attitudes. That's why the worldviews of students from different categories of educational institutions was found as polarized.

This polarization was found at extreme between Islamic schools (madrassas) and private English schools, particularly on the issues of religious militancy and tolerance. In this regard, they were seemed as inhabitants of different and violently opposed worlds. The researcher predicted that, in the future, this polarization might be a source of social instability, internal conflict and violence in Pakistan.

Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), as quoted by Ali, revealed that massive poverty in the country is a major contributing factor behind madrassa admissions, while religious emotions play minimal role in this regard. IPS found a vast majority of madrassa students as the children of landless peasants, rural artisans, rural laborers, small shopkeepers, or imams of village mosques. The study found most of madrassa teachers in the same socio-economic bracket where their students exist.

Ahmad conducted a comparative study in two sister countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The study focused on four areas: first, social influence of madrassa and its *ulema*; second, madrassa as a possible source of social mobility; third, Bangladesh's integrated approach for education as role model; and fourth, Western campaign of connecting madrassa with terrorism. [20].

The study found that, in Pakistan, socio-political influence of *Ulema* and their madrassa system has always retaliated to the government's every attempt to reconstruct Islamic education in the country. Several times, the governments tried to introduce social reform programs by ignoring or re-negotiating religion: but, all the times clergy gave a strong resistance. Clergy always discouraged to bridge-up the gap between traditional Islamic education and modern secular education.

The study found that financial sovereignty of madrassas enabled clergy to neutralize state's efforts. The base of this financial sovereignty was found that madrassas were the personal enterprises, and independent religio-political power-base for prominent *ulema*. Usually, the founders of madrassas were the people of good standing with a degree of influence on local community, which enabled them to generate resources for madrassa, like, acquiring of land, funds for construction of building, and a constant financial support.

The study revealed that most of the madrassa students come from larger but lower income families. He referred Bangladeshi successful model of public-private partnership in education, and revealed that 32 percent university teachers in the faculties of humanities and social sciences were found madrassa graduates. It means, madrassa education played role in upward social mobility of marginalized social groups. The author suggested it a role model for Pakistan.

The researcher also made a content analysis of madrassa syllabi in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and found no motivational material for violence. Thus, the study showed no association between terrorism and madrassa education. Rather it revealed that madrassa graduates, compared to mainstream graduates, do not face intense situation of unemployment. They conveniently find jobs commensurate with their training.

Nelson conducted a study in Rawalpindi district of Pakistan, in order to understand the reasons of madrassa enrollments in the country. He examined the nature of educational ideals of the parents of madrassa students. He made a list of five probable educational goals, and asked parents to identify their educational priorities from the list. He found that 'religious education' got top priority of the parents. Then, he asserted that main reason behind madrassa enrollments was a high level of religiosity among parents [21].

Cockcroft *et al.* also found the same results. Cockcroft and his colleagues found that parents wanted their children to learn religion: and when they saw it impossible in formal schools, they sent their children to madrassas. Economic condition of parents did not matter in this regard [22]. The author also referred two evidences: 1) madrassa admission ratio remained constant despite the state started to provide madrassa-like facilities in public schools, like free education, free books, free uniform, and even monthly stipend (for girls); 2) poverty mainly persists in rural Baluchistan and rural Sind, but madrassa enrolment was least in these areas according to surveys like Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) 1998, 2001, and Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurements(PSLM) 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006-2007.

Andrabi *et al.* conducted a special educational census in Pakistan, which revealed that madrassa enrolments in Pakistan were just 0.3% of the children in age group 5 to19. [23] The overall enrolment rate of this group was found 42%. It means that 0.7 percent of all the enrolled children were going to madrassa. ICG (2002) had claimed this figure 33% instead of 0.7%.

Knapp discussed the concept of '*jihad*', associated with Pakistani madrassas. He analyzed that the meanings of *jihad* in Arabic language was not 'holy war'. Rather, *jihad* means 'struggle' or 'striving' or 'to work with determination for a noble cause'. He pointed out that the non- Muslims population of the world took *jihad* as a substitute concept for terrorism: that is not correct. He noted that Western news media misunderstood *jihad* but used this term so excessively, after 9/11, that much misperceptions have been raised on this Islamic notion. [24]

Bergen and Pandey have documented a study on perceived connection between madrassa and global terrorism [25]. They picked up five major events of terrorism in the world: one) attack on World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001; two) bombing on World Trade Centre in 1993; three) bombing in London on July 7, 2005; four) Bali nightclub bombing in 2002; five) African embassy bombing in 1998. The scholars conducted case-to-case in-depth study of 79 terrorists involved in these events.

What surprising this study had revealed was that, the majority of the culprits of terrorism were highly qualified persons. Some of them were PhD degrees holders; and some others were doing PhDs. Some offenders were Medical Doctors, Engineers, and the holder of scientific or technical degrees. Engineering was found heart favourite subject among terrorists.

The study explored that none of the masterminds of these five terrorist attacks had ever attended madrassa. In this regard, the authors have also quoted Sageman, "madrassas are less closely correlated with producing terrorists than are Western colleges: where students from abroad may feel alienated or oppressed and may turn towards militant Islam."

The researchers stressed that the type of education or skill required for execution of a terrorist attacks is not available in madrassas. They argued that massive scale attacks need technical education and technology: that is out of reach of madrassas. Then the authors concluded that national security plans of Western countries were stupid: because they misleadingly focused on madrassa as a principal source of terrorism; whereas this institution is unable to produce potential terrorists.

Bano conducted a study during 2009 on madrassas in six countries: Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Bangladesh India and Pakistan. The findings of study rejected the general impression that madrassas cannot work with governments [26]. The author called madrassas as 'Faith Based Organizations' working like NGOs, which can respond to incentives, and enter into multidimensional relationships with the state.

The author discussed that every state has a modernization agenda, and religion may be a possible source of resistance in the way to complete this agenda. Now, it is responsibility of the state to form appropriate policies to avoid this resistance. The role of government is more important in the relationship between madrassas and state. Governments need to offer attractive incentives to madrassas to get their cooperation; and normally it happens. However, in Pakistan, government even didn't know the exact number of its madrassas. The incentives to madrassas were also very limited and unattractive.

Bano also conducted an in-depth study on a *deobandi* madrassa in Rawalpindi in 2007. She conducted more than three hundred interviews of madrassa teachers, students, and parents of students. Findings of this study suggested no correlation between madrassa education and any sort of violence [27]. Similarly, no association was found between absolute poverty and madrassa enrolments. Enrolment was found mainly the choice of students, and the role of parents was minimal in this regard.

The researcher noted that community keeps a check on madrassa activities and the moral authority of its administrator. People give donations through rational calculations based on efficiency of the madrassa and the commitment of its owner. This might be the reason that different madrassas in a same locality, finds different amount of donations. The author concluded that misunderstanding regarding the functioning of madrassa was due to the lack of scientific research in this area. Only few Taliban leaders studied in tribal madrassas, but US government became critical to whole madrassa system in Pakistan.

Haqqani, as quoted by Fair, elucidated how the traditional image of madrassa got changed in recent decades. He noted that the ascending of Taliban to power in Afghanistan, and their role as protectors of *Al Qaeda*, had changed the Western perception about this historically peaceful educational institution of Muslim societies [28]. The image of men in turbans and robes running a state provided a powerful demonstration effect, and politicised madrassa everywhere.

The scholar pointed out two political developments in the region during 1979: one, Iranian revolution, in which *Mullas* kicked out the Shah and took over the throne; and the other, Soviet occupation over Afghanistan. Since Iranian revolution was a fresh demonstration of religion's power: thus Muslims were confident that they could throw out Russia from Afghanistan, through a religion-based war.

United States involved in this war for its own interest to resist communism expansion. For this purpose, America used its influence on Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to fund for Afghan resistance. In Pakistan, the then President, General Ziaulhaq, decided to open madrassas, instead of schools, for five million Afghan-refugees. These madrassas acted as supply line of human resource for Afghan 'holy war'; and thus, at last, the war won by 'holy warriors'.

Haqqani indicated that, after the winning of this war by retreating Russian forces, different Armed Afghan groups began to fight with each other over the throne of Kabul. Thus, peace could not be ensured in Afghanistan. Then, again, madrassa students came forward, and played an unprecedented role. They defeated all war-groups, and brought peace in Afghanistan. They came into political power, and declared Afghanistan an Islamic state. It was unexpected and astonishing for the modern world. Therefore, since then, the perception about madrassa has been changed; and much fear has been aroused regarding the potential of this institution.

McClure examined the role of media in the projection madrassa-militancy controversy. He found that the link between few Pakistani madrassas and religious militancy was overblown by Western media [29]. The scholar pointed out some major weakness of Western media, in this regard. For example, the media showed madrassa enrolments through guesswork; it misinterprets madrassa curricula; it ignored the history and illogically politicizes madrassa education. The author argued that Western media need to ensure professional objectivity: and pay attention to overall reforms in Pakistan's educational system.

Winthrop and Graff mentioned three main fallacies in the literature on madrassa: a) madrassa counting was exaggeratedly stated; b) madrassa admission was



misperceived as last resort for the poor; c) increase in madrassa enrolments was illogically connected with increased religious militancy in society [30]. In this regard, some other significant findings of their study were as follows:

1. The demand of education for diverse segments of Pakistani society is more than capability of the government. It is not poverty, but failure of the government that a large numbers of children do not access education.
2. Education supply gap, itself, is a risk factor; in which low-income groups of society hardly become good citizens, and can involve in anti-social activities. Therefore, increasing access to education in Pakistan will help reduce the risk of conflict, and will ultimately mitigate militancy.
3. Just supply of education, to meet the demand, is not an issue to be addressed: but also the quality of education is important for social stability and tolerant society. In Pakistan, quality of education is extremely poor, and can provide opportunity for militant recruitments.
4. Governance in education sector is also much weak. Ghost schools, absent teachers, insufficient furniture, deficient building, and lacking facilities indicate less attention of the government towards education. It creates dissatisfaction among youth. The situation is more sever in Baluchistan and FATA.
5. School syllabi are also catalyst in making intolerant and aggressive society. Wars with India, and Kashmir issue, both are part of the syllabi, which inculcate fanaticism in youth. Although some effort has been made to modify school syllabi, yet impact of class room environment is undeniably an important factor in building up ideologies. Therefore, teachers should also be focused, besides the syllabi.

The study concluded that undirected and low quality education, or completely inaccessibility to education, inflames the feeling of frustration, exclusion and antigovernment grievances: and all this results in violence.

## CONCLUSION:

All the above discussion leads to an understanding that World opinion on Pakistani madrassa, during the era under study, has been divided into three categories: 1).Madrassas play negative role in society: these can not be reformed: therefore, must be closed down. 2). Madrassas can be made beneficial for state and society if reformed by insertion of modern knowledge into their curricula. 3).Madrassas are just providing shelter for the poor: let them carry on their business, and do not care of them.

An ironic fact was noticed in literature that empirical data based analytical writings were fewer as compared to the general writings. In this regard, various renowned journals of Sociology were also seen: but not even a single article was found addressing the issue of Pakistani madrassas. Therefore, most of the published material was found with a journalistic touch.

Another amazing fact was noted that the researchers, who found in their studies a connection of madrassa with terrorism, mostly have referred 'Madrassas Haqqania of Akora Khatak' or 'Madrassa Banoria of Karachi'. Geographically, 'Madrassa Haqqania' is situated in mountains of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan and represents a specific culture of that region. This madrassa has been a flash point for researchers because Mullah Umar, the chief leader of Afghan-Taliban, had studied here for some time. 'Madrassa Banoria' of Karachi had played a significant *jihadi* role in 1980s during Soviet-Afghan war. It provided human resource for the battlefield and financial help for the families of the warriors (*mujahideen*). The owners of this madrassa (Usmani brothers) have repeatedly acknowledged before media that several students and teachers from their madrassa participated in armed struggle against Soviet occupation over Afghan land.

The question, in this regard, rises here: can the findings of two or three special madrassas be generalized over all Pakistani madrassas? Can these few madrassas serve as representative samples for scientific studies? Does their involvement in Afghan-Russia war necessarily mean that they were now producing terrorists?

In this regard, it can be argued that there might be some other factor behind certain madrassas' involvement in Afghan-Russia war; and there might be specific reasons behind the specific attitude of youth in a particular region. Nonetheless, no study was available that could compare the behaviour of madrassa students with the students of formal schools in the region where violence in madrassa students was reported. In fact, a scientific research is still needed to explore it.

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